

Thank you for joining, we'll begin the call momentarily.





Laboratory Outreach Communication System (LOCS) Call Monday, June 17, 2024, at 3:00 P.M. ET

- Welcome
 - Sean Courtney, CDC Division of Laboratory Systems
- Situational Update and Response to the Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Outbreak in U.S. Dairy Cattle
 - Charles (Todd) Davis and Marie Kirby, CDC Influenza Division
- SARS-CoV-2 Viral Shedding and Rapid Antigen Test Performance Respiratory Virus Transmission Network, November 2022–May 2023
 - Sarah (Lizzy) Smith-Jeffcoat, CDC Coronavirus and Other Respiratory Viruses Division



About DLS

Vision

Exemplary laboratory science and practice advance clinical care, public health, and health equity.



Four Goal Areas



Quality Laboratory Science

 Improve the quality and value of laboratory medicine for better health outcomes and public health surveillance



Highly Competent Laboratory Workforce

 Strengthen the laboratory workforce to support clinical and public health laboratory practice



Safe and Prepared Laboratories

 Enhance the safety and response capabilities of clinical and public health laboratories



Accessible and Usable Laboratory Data

 Increase access and use of laboratory data to support response, surveillance, and patient care



DLS ECHO Biosafety Program

- Next session on June 25, 12:00 PM ET
 - Topic: Support Communication and Documented Information
 - Speakers: Marian Downing RBP, CBSP, SM(NRCM) and Domenica Zimmerman
- For questions, contact <u>DLSbiosafety@cdc.gov</u>



Scan the QR code to register

www.cdc.gov/safelabs/resources-tools/echo-biosafety.html



We Want to Hear From You!

Training and Workforce Development

Questions about education and training?

Contact LabTrainingNeeds@cdc.gov





LOCS Calls



On this page, you can find:

- LOCS Call information
- Transcripts
- Slides
- Audio Recordings

https://www.cdc.gov/locs/calls



How to Ask a Question

Using the Zoom Webinar System

- Click the Q&A button in the Zoom webinar system
- Type your question in the Q&A box and submit it
- Please do not submit a question using the chat button



- For media questions, please contact CDC Media Relations at <u>media@cdc.gov</u>
- If you are a patient, please direct any questions to your healthcare provider



Division of Laboratory Systems

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Situational Update and Response to the Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N1) Outbreak in U.S. Dairy Cattle

Todd Davis Branch Chief (acting) Virology, Surveillance, and Diagnosis Branch Influenza Division National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases Centers for Disease Control and Prevention





H5N1 in U.S. Cattle, 2024

- As of June 13, 2024, USDA has confirmed HPAI in dairy herds in **95** farms across **12** states:
 - CO (5), ID (22), IA (2), KS (4), MI (25), MN (3), NC (1), NM (8), OH (1), SD (5), TX (18), WY (1)
- Other animal species reported on dairy premises:
 - 5 wild birds (2 TX farms)
 - 6 wild foxes (1 NM, 1 MI farm)
 - 11 cats (3 MI, 3 NM, 1 OH, 3 TX farms)
 - 1 racoon (NM)
 - 2 opossums (MI)
- WI & MN to require neg H5N1 test for lactating dairy cattle in fairs & exhibitions





Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) Detections in Livestock; WAHIS (woah.org); HPAI Detections in Mammals (usda.gov); Highly Pathogenic; Wisconsin to require lactating cattle to have negative H5N1 test for fairs - Sioux County Radio; Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5N1 Genotype B3.13 in Dairy Cattle: National Epidemiologic Brief (usda.gov) 11

Monitoring of Exposed Persons

Monitoring Strategies

- Active outreach to states with positive cattle herds
- Human monitoring and testing in states
- Enhanced influenza surveillance
- Planned epidemiologic studies

Since Feb 2022

- CDC and state and local health departments actively monitor people exposed to infected birds, poultry or other animals for 10 days after exposure
 - At least 9,500 people monitored and
 - At least 350 people tested for novel influenza A

Current outbreak (2024)

- >550 people actively monitored
- Additional persons passively monitored
- States and CDC have tested >45 persons
- Three cases identified; all recovered

CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention CDC 24/7: Saving Lives, Protecting People™		Search	С
nfluenza (Flu)			
wian Flu $>$ Information for Specific Groups			
🕈 Avian Flu	Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(F	15N1) Virus in	
Current Situation +	Animals: Interim Recommendations f	or Prevention	
Bird Flu in Birds	Monitoring and Public Health Investig	pations	
Bird Flu in Pets and Other Animals	Español Other Languages Print	54410110	
Bird Flu in People +		On This Page	
Avian Influenza Type A Viruses	Summary The purpose of this guidance is to outline CDC's recommendations for preventing exposures to highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5N1) viruses, infection prevention and control measures including the use of personal protective equipment, testing, antiviral treatment, patient investigations, monitoring of exposed persons, including persons exposed to sick or dead wild and domesticated animals and livestock with suspected or confirmed infection with highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5N1) virus, and antiviral chemoprophylaxis of exposed persons. These recommendations are based on information available as of March 2024 and will be updated as needed when new information becomes available.	Summary	
Prevention and Antivirals		Background	
Information for Specific Groups —		Recommendations for the Pu	blic
Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(HSN1) Virus in Animals: Interim Recommendations for Prevention, Monitoring, and Public Health Investigations		Recommendations for Farmer	rs
		Recommendations for Clinicia	ans
		Recommendations for State Health Departments	
Backyard Flock Owners		Recommendations for Surveil	llance
Information for People Exposed to	Background	and Testing	

How CDC is monitoring influenza data to better understand the current avian influenza A (H5N1) situation in people | Avian Influenza (Flu)



H5N1 Human Cases

- Three human cases of HPAI A(H5N1) virus infection associated with dairy cattle
 - April 1 Texas announced
 - May 22 Michigan announced
 - May 30 Michigan announced
- All cases were in adults working at commercial dairy farms
 - No relationship to each other
 - Three different farms
- Two had conjunctivitis, one mild ILI
 - Not hospitalized, all recovered
 - Isolation recommended
- No human-to-human transmission
- Viruses remain



Uyeki TM,... Davis CT. N Engl J Med. 2024 Jun 6;390(21):2028-2029.

<u>Technical Update: Summary Analysis of Genetic Sequences of Highly Pathogenic Avian</u> <u>Influenza A(H5N1) Viruses in Texas (cdc.gov)</u>



Epidemiologic Investigations

- Working with health and agricultural partners at local, state and federal level, as well as with affected farms
- Important public health questions
 - Is there evidence of infection with HPAI A(H5N1) virus in exposed populations?
 - If we find infections, what is the spectrum of illness and rate of asymptomatic infections?
 - What are the types of exposure to HPAI A(H5N1) virus on farms/dairies?
 - Are any behaviors are associated with human infections with HPAI A(H5N1) virus or protection from infection?
- Assess risk for symptomatic and asymptomatic infection through specimen collection and a survey to assess exposures



Enhanced summer surveillance - Epidemiology

- 1. Symptom monitoring among **workers and others with recent exposures** to HPAI A/H5 infected animals on farms or other locations
- 2. Conduct **outreach and education to people exhibiting animals** (specifically swine, cattle and avian species) **at or attending agricultural fairs**.
- 3. Encourage **ongoing influenza testing (preferably RT-PCR) of individuals with compatible illness throughout the summer**, particularly for persons with recent history of relevant exposures
- 4. Enhance surveillance for novel influenza A detection among **severely ill patients** by subtyping influenza A positive specimens from patients **hospitalized or in the ICU**.
- 5. Enhance surveillance for novel influenza A detections in the community by maintaining the flow of influenza positive specimens to and subtyping of influenza A positives by public health laboratories and **investigation of unexplained clusters of respiratory illness**.
- 6. Monitor influenza surveillance data for any **unexpected patterns**.
- 7. Local **data anomaly** detection and investigation.



Expanded Influenza Genomics and Analysis Capacity

- CDC sequences ~6,000 viruses each year
- National Influenza Reference Centers (NIRCS)
 - Wisconsin State Lab of Hygiene
 - New York Department of Health
 - California Department of Public Health
- Expansion to additional state and local public health labs
 - Influenza Sequencing Centers (ISCs)
 - Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Texas







Expanding Viral Genomic Sequencing Infrastructure in the U.S. (cdc.gov)

PHL ASSOCIATION OF

Enhanced summer surveillance - Laboratory

CDC requests commercial laboratories continue to send the following specimens to PHLs as soon as possible for further testing and characterization.

- 1. Influenza A positive specimens that are subtype negative on tests designed to provide an influenza subtyping result **and confirmed upon retest.**
- 2. Influenza A positive specimens that are subtype influenza A(H1) and not influenza A(H1)pdm09 on tests designed to provide an influenza subtyping result **and confirmed upon retest.**

Acceptable sample types for use of CDC's A/H5 assay:

- Human upper respiratory specimens from patients with signs and symptoms of respiratory infection
- Human lower respiratory tract specimens from patients with signs and symptoms of respiratory infection
- Paired nasopharyngeal/ conjunctival specimens

Enhanced Surveillance to subtype more samples

- Influenza A and B positive specimens that have not undergone influenza subtyping
 - Determine an appropriate number of samples each month
 - Samples that meet the established assay cutoff of your testing method to identify positive samples.
 - Determine a process by which samples will be submitted to state and local public health laboratories or national reference laboratories for subtyping



https://www.cdc.gov/flu/avianflu/guidance-commercial-laboratories.htm

Diagnostic testing

- FDA granted enforcement discretion for the use of conjunctival swabs with the CDC Human Influenza Virus Real-Time RT-PCR Diagnostic Panel, Influenza A/H5 Subtyping Kit
 - Public health laboratories may use of conjunctival swabs with this test
 - Must be paired testing of conjunctival specimens with testing of a nasopharyngeal swab
 - Using swabs and transport media currently included in the current CDC test's instructions for use
 - PHLs must perform in-house verification performance studies; CMS guidelines.
- USDA/APHIS issued a temporary exemption of H5 avian influenza viruses as a Select Agent for 3 years
- Call to Industry to seek proposals for the OTA (Other Transaction Authority) to develop commercial H5
 assays is live at <u>www.sam.gov</u>.
 - <u>CDC Open Call to Industry Influenza A(H5) Diagnostic Test Development and Validation</u>
- Drafting recommendations/protocol for conjunctival sample collection methods for healthcare providers
- Working with FDA to consider addition of Universal Transport Media for sample collection of specimens tested by CDC's H5 assay



05/31/2024: Lab Advisory: Enforcement Discretion Granted for the Use of Conjunctival Swabs with the CDC Human Influenza Virus Real-Time RT-PCR Diagnostic Panel, Influenza A/H5 Subtyping Kit

Thank you!

For more information, contact CDC 1-800-CDC-INFO (232-4636) TTY: 1-888-232-6348 www.cdc.gov



The findings and conclusions in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.





SARS-CoV-2 viral shedding and rapid antigen test performance

Respiratory Virus Transmission Network, November 2022–May 2023

Lizzy Smith-Jeffcoat, MPH Epidemiology Branch, CORVD, NCIRD, CDC

CDC's Laboratory Outreach Communication System Call June 17, 2024

Published in MMWR on April 25, 2024. https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/73/wr/mm7316a2.htm

Background



Adapted from: Ian M. Campell, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Diagnostic_Medical_Dipstick.png



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Background

- Previous studies have shown that rapid antigen tests are less sensitive than RT-PCR, but closely correlate with viral culture
- Role and performance of antigen tests in diagnosing SARS-CoV-2 has been questioned as variants and population immunity have evolved

Comparison of Home Antigen Testing With RT-PCR and Viral Culture During the Course of SARS-CoV-2 Infection, January–April 2021



Objective: To reevaluate the performance characteristics of SARS-CoV-2 antigen tests with those of RT-PCR and viral culture during early 2023

Respiratory Virus Transmission Network *Antigen/culture sub-study*

Individuals testing positive for SCV2

Symptomatic





Statistical Methods

- Onset defined as first day of symptoms or, if asymptomatic, day of positive test
- Viral shedding
 - Percentage of positive rapid antigen, RT-PCR, and viral culture results each day post onset
 - Wilson score intervals to calculate 95% CI
- Antigen test sensitivity
 - Two references:
 - 1) same-day positive RT-PCR result
 - 2) same-day positive culture result
 - Stratified by symptom status, presence of fever or cough, and presence of fever alone
 - Cluster-robust bootstrapping to calculate 95% CI

Analytic Population



Participant Characteristics

Characteristic	N = 236 ¹
Age at enrollment, years	36 (17, 50)
Female gender	140 (59%)
Race/ethnicity	
White, Non-Hispanic	133 (56%)
Hispanic/Latino	69 (29%)
Black, Non-Hispanic	17 (7.2%)
Other	14 (5.9%)
Unk/Refused	3 (1.3%)
Social Vulnerability Index	0.43 (0.19, 0.80)
Any chronic medical condition	110 (47%)
Any COVID-19 symptom	219 (93%)
Any prior COVID (self-reported or anti-N)	102 (43%)
Vaccinated ≤12 month before enrollment	92 (40%)

SARS-CoV-2 viral shedding by RT-PCR, rapid antigen, and viral culture tests



Rapid antigen test sensitivity



Rapid antigen test sensitivity



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Conclusions

- Rapid antigen and viral culture detected similar proportion of infections, but detection by RT-PCR was higher
- Rapid antigen tests remain less sensitive than RT-PCR (47%), but similar to viral culture (80%)
- Rapid antigen test sensitivity was higher when symptoms were present

Public Health Implications

• Findings are similar, but context is different

- High population immunity
- Lower hospitalization and death rates
- Several outpatient antiviral treatments available
- Patients at higher risk for severe illness and eligible for antiviral treatments would benefit from RT-PCR or other high sensitivity diagnostic soon after symptom onset
 - If not available, follow FDA's serial antigen testing recommendations

Thank you!

Questions?

Lizzy Smith-Jeffcoat, <u>uyi7@cdc.gov</u>

- CDC RVTN Team
 - Lexie Mellis
 - Jessica Biddle
 - Hannah Kirking
 - Phil Salvatore

For more information, contact CDC 1-800-CDC-INFO (232-4636) TTY: 1-888-232-6348 cdc.gov

- RVTN Collaborating Institutions
 - Vanderbilt University Medical Center
 - Columbia University/New York-Presbyterian Hospital
 - Marshfield Clinic Research Institute
 - University of Arizona
 - Children's Hospital Colorado
 - Emory University
- RVTN Participants

The findings and conclusions in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position of the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.





Next Scheduled Call

Monday, July 15 3 PM - 4 PM ET



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