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Persons using assistive technology might not be able to fully access information in this file. For assistance, please send e-mail to: mmwrq@cdc.gov. Type 508 Accommodation and the title of the report in the subject line of e-mail. Syndromic Surveillance of Infectious Diseases in Taiwan --- Before and After the Challenges of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)Chwan-Chuen King,1 F-Y.
Shih,1,8 M-Y. Yen,2 F-C. Hu,1 J-S. Wu,1,3 F-K. Chang,3 L-W. Lin,3 J-Y. Yang, H-Y. Chen,3 T-S. Wu,1 D-J. Wang,3 K-T. Chen,3 H-T. Yu,4 C-A. Hsiung,4 S-W. Lu,3 C-M. Chang,3 S-T. Lin,2 C-J. Fu,6 C-M.
Huang,2 M-S. Ho,5 H. Chang,7 J-H. Chou,3 S-J. Twu,4 I-J. Su,3 M. Marx,9 H. Sobel10
Corresponding author: Chwan-Chuen King, Institute of Epidemiology, College of Public Health, National Taiwan University, 1 Jen-Ai Road Section 1, Taipei, Taiwan (100). E-mail: a1234567@ccms.ntu.edu.tw. AbstractIntroduction: Timely and sensitive outbreak detection is a high priority of syndromic surveillance. Early detection enables officials to allocate limited public health resources to contain outbreaks and thereby decrease morbidity and mortality. Objectives: This study retrospectively evaluated Taiwan's respiratory syndromic surveillance system (RSSS), established in July 2000, for its ability to detect severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). Methods: Reporting through RSSS was encouraged for patients aged >5 years with unexplained cough, respiratory distress, pulmonary edema, or other severe symptoms. Their specimens were collected for laboratory testing of suspected etiologic agents. Results: Among 112 reported acute respiratory syndrome cases during January 1--August 5, 2003, etiologic agents were identified for 26 cases, and only four SARS cases and one case co-infected with SARS-associated coronavirus (SARS Co-V) and Mycoplasma were detected. Only five (0.75%) of 664 probable SARS cases were captured through RSSS. The first SARS case, reported on March 14, 2003, was not detected by RSSS, reflecting the system's low sensitivity. RSSS did not detect a SARS case until March 17, 2003, after awareness had been raised by media reports. Conclusions: Because RSSS was both insensitive and rarely used before the SARS outbreak, and because public health administrators urgently needed daily updated case numbers and laboratory results, Taiwan instituted an Internet-based reporting and a day-to-day medical follow-up form immediately after the peak of hospital-associated SARS. Emergency department-based syndromic surveillance was established in July 2003, and different hospital data sets are being integrated into the system to facilitate detection of future outbreaks of emerging infectious diseases.
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