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Waterborne-Disease Outbreaks, 1989–1990

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SUMMARY

For the 2-year period 1989-1990, 16 states reported 26 outbreaks due to water intended for drinking; an estimated total of 4,288 persons became ill in these outbreaks. Giardia lamblia was implicated as the etiologic agent for seven of the 12 outbreaks in which an agent was identified. The outbreaks of giardiasis were all associated with ingestion of unfiltered surface water or surface-influenced groundwater. An outbreak with four deaths was attributed to Escherichia coli O157:H7, the only bacterial pathogen implicated in any of the outbreak investigations. An outbreak of remitting, relapsing diarrhea was associated with cyanobacteria (blue-green algae)-like bodies, whose role in causing diarrheal illness is being studied. Two outbreaks due to hepatitis A and one due to a Norwalk-like agent were associated with use of well water. Eighteen states reported a total of 30 outbreaks due to the use of recreational water, which resulted in illness for an estimated total of 1,062 persons. These 30 reports comprised 13 outbreaks of whirlpool- or hot tub-associated Pseudomonas folliculitis; 13 outbreaks of swimming-associated gastroenteritis, including five outbreaks of shigellosis; one outbreak of hepatitis A associated with a swimming pool; and three cases of primary amebic meningoencephalitis caused by Naegleria. The national surveillance of outbreaks of waterborne diseases, which has proceeded for 2 decades, continues to be a useful means for characterizing the epidemiology of waterborne diseases.



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INTRODUCTION

The reporting of waterborne-disease outbreaks (WBDOs) is voluntary in the United States. Information on the occurrence and causes of WBDOs is available from 1920 onward (1). Since 1971, CDC, in collaboration with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), has tabulated data concerning WBDOs separately from those for foodborne-disease outbreaks and has compiled these data in surveillance summaries. The two most recent surveillance reports summarized data from 1986 to 1988 and from 1985 (2,3). In 1989, responsibility for the surveillance system shifted within the National Center for Infectious Diseases, CDC, from the Division of Bacterial and Mycotic Diseases, Enteric Diseases Branch, to the Division of Parasitic Diseases, Parasitic Diseases Branch, primarily because of the prominent role of *Giardia lamblia* as an etiologic agent in WBDOs. This surveillance summary includes data for outbreaks in 1989 and 1990 and also for previously unreported outbreaks in 1988.

In addition to WBDOs associated with water intended for drinking, the surveillance summaries include data about a) outbreaks associated with exposure to water used for recreational purposes and b) outbreaks of gastroenteritis (whether waterborne or foodborne) on ocean-going passenger vessels that call on ports in the United States.

CDC's activities related to waterborne diseases have the following goals: a) to characterize the epidemiology of waterborne diseases; b) to identify the deficiencies in water systems and the etiologic agents that are associated with outbreaks, so that improved water systems can be designed; c) to teach public health personnel how to investigate WBDOs; and d) to collaborate with local, state, and other federal (e.g., EPA) and international agencies on initiatives to prevent waterborne diseases.

State health departments can request CDC and EPA to provide epidemiologic assistance in investigating WBDOs. In addition, CDC and EPA can be consulted about the engineering and environmental aspects of water treatment and about collecting large-volume water samples to identify viruses, parasites, and pathogenic bacteria.

METHODS

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Sources of Data

State health departments report WBDOs to CDC on a standard form, which was revised in 1991 (CDC Form 52.12, Rev. 02-91; Figure 1). In November 1990, CDC personnel sent a letter to state and territorial epidemiologists requesting reports of all previously unreported outbreaks; many states had designated a person to coordinate the surveillance of WBDOs. States that did not respond to the letter were contacted by telephone. In addition, personnel from the Health Effects Research Laboratory of EPA contacted state water-supply agencies to obtain information about WBDOs.

As part of their request to enter a port, vessel masters of cruise ships must report the number of persons who visited the ship's physician because of diarrheal illness during the voyage. If 3% or more of the passengers on a 1-week voyage reported diarrheal illness, a quarantine officer and a member of CDC's Vessel Sanitation Program board and inspect the ship, and an epidemiologic investigation may be conducted. Data from these investigations are summarized here.

Definitions of terms

The surveillance system for WBDOs, like the system for foodborne-disease outbreaks, is unusual in that the unit of analysis is an outbreak of any of a variety of



waterborne diseases, rather than an individual case of a particular disease. The system's definition for a WBDO comprises two criteria: a) at least two persons must have experienced a similar illness after ingesting or using water intended for drinking or after being exposed to or unintentionally ingesting or inhaling fresh or marine water used for recreational purposes, and b) epidemiologic evidence must implicate the water as the source of the illness. The stipulation that at least two persons be ill is waived for single cases of chemical poisoning, if laboratory studies indicate that water was contaminated by the chemical, and for single cases of laboratory-confirmed primary amebic meningoencephalitis. If primary and secondary cases are distinguished on the outbreak report form, only primary cases are included in the case counts on the line listings.

Whirlpool- and hot tub-associated outbreaks of folliculitis due to *Pseudomonas* are included in the surveillance system, but wound infections caused by water-related organisms, such as *Aeromonas* species, are not. Outbreaks of Pontiac fever associated with whirlpools are listed, but outbreaks of Legionnaires' disease traditionally have not been included.

Community water systems are defined as public or investor-owned systems that serve large or small communities, subdivisions, or trailer parks with at least 15 service connections or 25 year-round residents. Noncommunity water systems serve institutions, industries, camps, parks, hotels, or service stations that may be used by the general public. Community and noncommunity water systems are classified as public water systems and are regulated under the Safe Drinking Water Act (PL 93-523) of 1974. Approximately 189,600 water systems in the United States are classified as public water systems (4); 31% of these are community water systems, which serve 91% of the U.S. population, and 69% are noncommunity water systems. The remaining water systems, which serve 9% of the U.S. population, are nonpublic or individual systems used by one or several residences or by persons traveling outside populated areas; they are generally wells or springs.

Deficiencies in water systems are classified as follows: 1 = untreated surface water (e.g., from rivers, streams, lakes, or reservoirs); 2 = untreated groundwater (e.g., from wells or springs); 3 = treatment deficiency (e.g., temporary interruption of disinfection, chronically inadequate disinfection, no filtration, or inadequate filtration); 4 = distribution system deficiency (e.g., a cross-connection, back siphonage, contamination of water mains during construction or repair, or contamination of a storage facility); and 5 = unknown or miscellaneous deficiency. In this surveillance summary, no outbreaks with miscellaneous deficiencies were reported. If more than one deficiency was reported for an outbreak, only the deficiency judged to be the most important is noted on the line listing (Tables 1 and 2).

Interpretation of Data

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The data in this surveillance summary should be interpreted with caution; they cannot be used to determine the true incidence of WBDOs or the relative incidence of outbreaks of various etiologies. Presumably only a fraction of the actual total number of outbreaks is reported to CDC and EPA, but the extent of underreporting is unknown.

The likelihood that individual cases of illness will be epidemiologically linked and attributed to exposure to water varies considerably among locales and is dependent on such factors as consumer awareness, physician interest, and surveillance activities



of state and local health and environmental agencies. Therefore, the states that recognize and report the most WBDOs are not necessarily the states with the most outbreaks. Large outbreaks and those involving serious illnesses are most likely to come to the attention of health authorities. Outbreaks in community water systems are more likely to be reported than those in noncommunity water systems, since the latter serve primarily nonresidential areas and transient populations. Outbreaks in individual systems are the most underreported because they generally involve small numbers of persons.

The proportion of the total number of reported outbreaks that is attributed to a particular etiologic agent depends in part on the interests and expertise of the investigators. For example, epidemiologists and microbiologists interested in particular organisms, such as *Giardia lamblia* or Norwalk-like agents, are likely to obtain the necessary specimens and perform the necessary laboratory procedures to confirm the causative agent. Furthermore, the proportion of the total number of reported cases of waterborne diseases that is attributed to a particular etiologic agent can be substantially changed by the occurrence of a few large outbreaks due to that agent. The number of cases reported for an outbreak generally is an approximate figure; the method and accuracy of the approximation vary among outbreaks.

An outbreak is included in the surveillance summary if the data on the report form suggest that the outbreak was caused by exposure to contaminated water. The quality of the data implicating water, however, varies widely among the outbreaks. Factors influencing the quality of the data include the health department's budgetary, investigative, and laboratory resources and the timing of the investigation with respect to the course of the outbreak. Delayed recognition of outbreaks is a major impediment to timely investigations.

This surveillance summary incorporates a new classification system (Table 3) that indicates the strength of the evidence implicating water for each outbreak in the line listings (Tables 1, 2, and 4). Each outbreak (except outbreaks of *Pseudomonas* folliculitis and individual cases of primary amebic meningoencephalitis) was assigned a classification number (I through IV) that reflects both the kind of epidemiologic data and the presence or absence of water quality data on the outbreak report form. Epidemiologic data were given preeminence over water quality data; outbreaks without supporting epidemiologic data were not included in the surveillance summary, whereas some outbreaks without water quality data were included. The intent of the classification system is to provide the reader with additional information about the data that were available to implicate water. Classification numbers of II, III, and IV are not intended to reflect badly on the investigators, since not all outbreaks could or should have been investigated rigorously. On the other hand, a classification number of 1 does not necessarily imply that the investigation was optimal, but simply that both epidemiologic and water quality data implicated water.

RESULTS

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Outbreaks due to Water Intended for Drinking

For the 2-year period 1989–1990, 16 states reported a total of 26 outbreaks due to water intended for drinking, which resulted in illness for an estimated total of 4,288 persons. Twenty (77%) outbreak investigations were classified as Class I (i.e., adequate epidemiologic and water-quality data were provided on the report form).

Vol. 40, No. SS-3

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The individual outbreaks are listed by state in Table 1; in Table 5, data are summarized by etiologic agent and type of water system. The median size of the outbreaks was 54 persons (range, 3-1,000). Ten (38%) of the outbreaks were reported from three states: Pennsylvania (four), Missouri (three), and New York (three). Although Pennsylvania reported the most outbreaks, all were relatively small (the largest affected 63 persons). Overall, 12 outbreaks were reported for 1989 and 14 for 1990. Outbreaks began in each month except January and October; six (23%) began in July (Figure 2).

Giardia lamblia was implicated as the etiologic agent for seven of the 12 outbreaks for which an agent was identified. Outbreaks of waterborne giardiasis, which affected an estimated 697 persons, were reported from New York (three), Colorado (two), Vermont (one), and Alaska (one); they began in February (one), March (two), April (one), June (one), July (one), and August (one). *Giardia* was identified in stool specimens from ill persons for all seven outbreaks and also in water samples for four of the outbreaks. Four outbreaks were associated with community water systems and three with noncommunity water systems. Surface water supplies were implicated for six outbreaks, and in the other, the water source was a spring that was vulnerable to contamination above ground because of land erosion. Six outbreaks were associated with treatment deficiencies (chlorination that was not cysticidal; lack of filtration); the other outbreak, which occurred at a lodge, was associated with untreated river water that was used because the usual source of water (well water) was frozen.

The only outbreak attributed to a bacterial pathogen was also the outbreak associated with the most severe illness. A large outbreak (243 cases) due to *Escherichia coli* O157:H7, which had not previously been established to be a waterborne pathogen, occurred in a Missouri community (*5*). One-third of the ill persons had bloody diarrhea, 32 were hospitalized, two had hemolytic uremic syndrome, and four died. Multiresistant *E. coli* O157:H7 was isolated from stool specimens from ill persons, but not from water samples. However, an epidemiologic investigation implicated the community water system as the source of infection. Although unchlorinated well water was used by the community, the water distribution network was the likely source of contamination. Shortly before the outbreak peaked, two large broken water transmission pipes were repaired and more than 40 water meters were replaced without disinfection of the water system at the points of repair or replacement.

The first outbreak in this surveillance system associated with cyanobacteria (blue-green algae)-like bodies (CLB) occurred in a hospital in Chicago (6). Ill persons had remissions and relapses of explosive watery diarrhea. Light microscopic examination of stool specimens from ill persons demonstrated the presence of CLB, but no ova or parasites, and cultures were negative for common bacterial pathogens. Illness was associated with drinking water in a building for which open-air rooftop storage tanks were used to maintain water pressure. Before the outbreak, failure of the water pump used to fill the tanks caused both of the tanks to empty. Although CLB per se were not found in samples of the water, algae (primarily diatoms) were found in a storage tank.

Serologic testing implicated viral pathogens for three outbreaks associated with the use of well water. Hepatitis A was implicated in investigations of two outbreaks in Pennsylvania. One water supply, which was chlorinated, had a chlorinator malfunction; the other was untreated well water that was found to be contaminated

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with fecal coliforms. Well-water samples were not tested for the presence of hepatitis A virus; however, the virus was recovered from well water in the investigation of a similar outbreak in 1982 in Georgia (7). A Norwalk-like agent was implicated as the cause of an outbreak that affected an estimated 900 persons at a new resort in Arizona; the outbreak was caused by effluent from the sewage treatment facility seeping directly into the resort's deep well through cracks in the subsurface rock (8).

In 14 (54%) outbreaks, the etiology of acute gastrointestinal illness (AGI) was not determined; many of these outbreaks had features (e.g., symptom complex, incubation period, and duration of illness) suggestive of viral causes. For eight of these outbreaks, stool specimens from ill persons were examined and were found to be negative for bacterial pathogens (all eight outbreaks) and parasites (two outbreaks); no specimens were examined for viruses. Coliforms were detected during investigations of the water systems for 12 of the 14 outbreaks. The largest of these outbreaks, in which an estimated 1,000 persons became ill over a period of several months, occurred at a country club in Tennessee whose two wells were within 20 feet of a septic tank; the well water was heavily contaminated with coliforms.

Overall, noncommunity water systems accounted for 46% of the 26 outbreaks and 58% of the 4,288 cases, whereas community water systems accounted for 42% of the outbreaks and 39% of the cases (Tables 5 and 6 and Figure 3). Comparable percentages of outbreaks associated with noncommunity (42%) and community (36%) water systems occurred during summer months.

Thirteen (50%) of the 26 outbreaks were associated with well water (Figure 3). Distribution system deficiencies caused two (15%) of the 13 outbreaks. The well water was untreated in five (38%) outbreaks. Of the six (46%) outbreaks associated with inadequate or interrupted disinfection, chlorine was the disinfectant used by four of the water systems, and iodine and ultraviolet light were each used by one.

Three (12%) of the 26 outbreaks were associated with spring water; in two, the spring water emerged above ground and therefore was vulnerable to contamination, and in the other, untreated spring water was used to augment the usual water supply. Of the 10 (38%) outbreaks associated with the use of surface water, six (60%) were associated with treatment deficiencies; five of the water systems provided chlorination as the only treatment, and one provided both chlorination and filtration. Of the remaining four systems, two (20%) were associated with the use of untreated water, one (10%) with a distribution system deficiency, and one (10%) with an unknown deficiency.

One possible outbreak in 1989 was not included in the line listing because of limited data, but illness may have been caused by contaminated bottled water. Two persons, both of whom lived in the same household in Idaho and drank bottled water exclusively, became ill; stool specimens were not provided, nor was an epidemio-logic investigation conducted. The ill persons stopped drinking the water after noting foreign objects in it and felt better within a few days. Water samples from previously unopened bottles had high standard plate counts, and diatoms were present. The water, which came from a river in Washington State, was chlorinated at a municipal plant and was passed through charcoal filters in the milk plant where it was bottled. However, the charcoal filters were bypassed on the day that the relevant water was bottled because they were clogged with diatoms.

Data regarding 12 other possible WBDOs reported to CDC were not included in this surveillance summary. In eight, either no supporting epidemiologic data or inade-

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quate data were provided (i.e., the outbreak investigations did not meet the criteria for Class I, II, III, or IV); in two, water may have been contaminated at its point of use rather than at its source or in its distribution system (e.g., ice or water may have been contaminated by a sick handler); and in two, a foodborne etiology was as likely or more likely than a waterborne etiology.

Outbreaks Associated with Recreational Water Use

For the 2-year period 1989–1990, 18 states reported a total of 30 outbreaks associated with water used for recreational purposes; 14 outbreaks were reported for 1989 and 16 for 1990 (Table 4). Outbreaks began in each month except November; 10 (33%) began in July (Figure 2). The outbreaks, which caused illness for an estimated total of 1,062 persons, affected a median of 10 persons (range, 1-300). Of the 30 reported outbreaks, 13 were of folliculitis; another 13, gastroenteritis, five of which were shigellosis; one, hepatitis A; and three were individual cases of primary amebic meningoencephalitis.

The 13 outbreaks of folliculitis, which affected from two to 300 persons, were associated with the use of whirlpools or hot tubs; in two of the outbreaks, ill persons had used both a whirlpool and a swimming pool, and thus these two possible sources could not be differentiated. Only one of the 13 outbreaks occurred during the summer. In eight of the outbreak investigations, *Pseudomonas* was confirmed to be the etiologic agent; in the other five, the clinical syndrome was consistent with this etiology. In six of the investigations, low chlorine or bromine concentrations in the water were documented, and in one, a low water pH was also demonstrated.

Shigella sonnei was implicated as the etiologic agent for five outbreaks of gastroenteritis; three were associated with swimming in lakes, one with swimming in a pond (9), and one with playing in a wading pool. Crowded conditions or poor water exchange may have been contributing factors in at least three of the outbreaks. Secondary cases of shigellosis were noted for three of the outbreaks.

An outbreak of serologically confirmed hepatitis A at a commercial campground in Louisiana was the first reported outbreak of hepatitis A associated with use of a swimming pool (10). Water quality data were not available; however, the filtering system of the pool was designed in such a way that a cross-connection may have existed between the water-intake line and a sewage line.

Three boys were reported to have died from primary amebic meningoencephalitis due to *Naegleria*. The organism was identified in the cerebrospinal fluid of two of the boys and at autopsy for the third. One boy had swum in a commercial swimming area in a lake in Arkansas; the other two had swum both in a swimming pool and in a lake or pond in Texas.

Previously Unreported Outbreaks in 1988

After the surveillance summary for 1986–1988 was published, reports of seven additional outbreaks in 1988 were received, two associated with water intended for drinking and five with recreational exposures (Table 2).

An outbreak of chronic gastrointestinal illness (CGI), the second reported in this surveillance system, was associated with drinking well water from a community water system in Oklahoma. Ill persons had watery diarrhea for a median of 13 months. No etiologic agent was identified despite an extensive search for bacterial, parasitic, and viral pathogens. Coliforms were not found in routine water samples collected during the outbreak.

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An outbreak of hepatitis A was associated with drinking fecally contaminated well water in a community in Washington. Although the source of contamination of the well was not identified, an old adjacent septic system was suspected to be leaking.

An outbreak of both Pontiac fever and *Pseudomonas* folliculitis was associated with the use of a whirlpool. III persons had fourfold rises in antibody titer to *Legionella pneumophila* serogroup 1; in addition, this organism and *Pseudomonas aeruginosa* were isolated from the whirlpool water.

During an investigation that began in 1988, high lead levels found among residents of rural areas on the big island of Hawaii were attributed to drinking water from rainwater catchment tanks sealed with lead-based paint. Information concerning this chemical exposure was not included in the line listing (Table 2) because the affected persons did not manifest signs of lead toxicity. However, four (6%) of 72 children under the age of 6 years who were tested had blood lead levels $\geq 15 \mu g/dl$ (none were $\geq 25 \mu g/dl$), and nine (3%) of 305 persons ≥ 6 years old had levels $\geq 40 \mu g/dl$ (maximum of 73.2); all but one of these persons drank water that was heavily contaminated with lead (maximum of 4520 ppb).

Outbreaks on Cruise Ships

In 1989 and 1990, CDC personnel investigated 15 outbreaks of diarrheal illness on nine cruise ships (four in 1989 and five in 1990) that call on U.S. ports; one of these ships was an intrastate cruise liner. The median size of the 13 outbreaks with data that could be evaluated was 208 passengers (range, 38-412).

On one ship, two outbreaks occurred during the same 15-day cruise; both outbreaks were associated with exposures on land. On another ship, outbreaks occurred on two consecutive week-long cruises; the second outbreak, which was associated with eating freshly cut fruit items and stuffed eggs, was attributed to a Norwalk-like virus. On an additional ship, outbreaks occurred on two cruises 1 week apart. An outbreak occurred on a different ship from the same cruise line during the intervening week; cold seafood items containing scallops were implicated as the probable vehicles of the outbreaks, and enterotoxigenic E. coli was the probable etiologic agent. On another ship, outbreaks occurred on four consecutive week-long cruises; the attack rates progressively decreased. A Norwalk-like virus was found in stool specimens from ill passengers from the first two cruises, but the source of infection was not determined. In the first foodborne outbreak of shigellosis on a cruise ship investigated by CDC, German potato salad was implicated as the vehicle and multiresistant Shigella flexneri 4a as the etiologic agent (11). Consumption of water and ice was associated with illness in an unrelated shipboard outbreak, but food histories were not available, and the etiologic agent was not identified. Etiologic agents and vehicles were not identified in the other investigations.

DISCUSSION

Outbreaks Associated with Water Intended for Drinking

The numbers of outbreaks associated with water intended for drinking reported for 1989 (12) and 1990 (14) were comparable with the numbers previously reported for 1987 (15) and 1988 (13) (2). Additional outbreaks for 1989-1990 may be reported in the future, just as this surveillance summary includes data about two additional outbreaks for 1988. In contrast to the statistics for 1987–1990, at least 20 outbreaks per

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year were reported for all previous years for which CDC and EPA have tabulated data (1971–1986) (Figures 4 and 5). The extent to which the decrease in the numbers of reported outbreaks (from a high of 53 in 1980) reflects a true decrease and not simply a reporting artifact is unknown and has been discussed previously (2,3). The requirement that outbreaks be investigated epidemiologically, which adds an element of complexity to the surveillance system, may be becoming more difficult to fulfill as the demands on health departments increase.

The relative proportions of outbreaks attributed to various types of water supplies and etiologic agents have remained fairly stable (Figures 4 and 5). Most outbreaks in 1989–1990 were associated with noncommunity or small community water systems, as has been noted for previous years (12). Only one outbreak occurred in a large metropolitan area (Chicago), but the outbreak was restricted to a hospital building and was due to a problem in the distribution system. The association of outbreaks with noncommunity or small community water systems may reflect the fact that large cities tend to have more sophisticated water treatment plants. On the other hand, sporadic cases of a waterborne disease that occur over a large metropolitan area may never be linked and may never be attributed to exposure to water, since ill persons in large cities are likely to consult different physicians.

Giardia lamblia was the most frequently identified etiologic agent in WBDOs for the 11th and 12th consecutive years. No outbreaks in 1989 or 1990 were attributed to *Cryptosporidium*, a protozoan parasite that is even more chlorine resistant than *Giardia*. A clinical case definition of acute giardiasis has been proposed that may prove useful to investigators of future outbreaks (13). Recently developed immunodiagnostics, such as monoclonal antibodies and enzyme-linked immunosorbent assays (14), may be useful for detecting *G. lamblia*-associated antigen in stool specimens and water samples during investigations of outbreaks.

As in the past, the outbreaks of giardiasis were associated with ingestion of unfiltered, inadequately chlorinated surface water or surface-influenced ground-water. *Giardia* (but not necessarily organisms even more resistant to chlorine) can be inactivated by disinfection without filtration, but only if stringent conditions are met and consistently maintained (*12,15,16*). The surface water treatment requirements (54 FR 27486-541, June 19, 1989) address regulations for treating surface water in public water systems and the criteria for exempting surface water from mandatory filtration. The addition of filtration to the water treatment process is an example of using multiple barriers to protect water supplies; treating sewage appropriately, preventing the contamination of watersheds, and using more than one water treatment process (e.g., disinfection and filtration of surface water) are all key elements in ensuring the availability of high-quality drinking water and preventing transmission of waterborne diseases (*12*).

During the period 1989–1990 only one WBDO was attributed to a bacterial pathogen, *E. coli* O157:H7; from 1971 to 1986, a mean of four outbreaks of bacterial diseases per year were reported. *E. coli* O157:H7 had never previously been associated with a WBDO in this surveillance system. However, waterborne transmission of this pathogen has been suspected previously (*17*), and it has been isolated from water (*18*). The severity of illness associated with this organism (*5*) reinforces the need to prevent WBDOs.

CLB, like E. coli O157:H7, had never previously been associated with a WBDO in this surveillance system. The role of CLB in causing diarrheal illness has not been

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defined and is currently being investigated. These organisms, which are difficult to classify taxonomically, have been identified in stool specimens from patients around the world (6, 19, 20).

Four outbreaks reported in this surveillance summary (including one from 1988) were attributed to viral pathogens, either hepatitis A or a Norwalk-like agent. These outbreaks, which were all associated with well water, raise the issue of how groundwater becomes contaminated. The outbreak that occurred at a new resort in the southwest (in which a Norwalk-like agent was implicated) was particularly instructive (8). The resort's deep well and sewage treatment facility had been designed according to state-of-the-art technology, permitting the well and leach fields to be in close proximity. However, malfunction of two leach fields allowed sewage effluent to pass rapidly through the remaining three fields; the effluent then flowed unimpeded through channels in the compressed sandstone and limestone directly into the well.

The EPA has recently drafted criteria for disinfection requirements for public water systems using groundwater sources that are not under the direct influence of surface water (*21*). The draft rule and the proposed rule are expected to be available for public comment in 1992 and 1993, respectively; promulgation is expected in 1995.

Over half (54%) of all reported outbreaks for 1989-1990 were classified as outbreaks of AGI of unknown etiology. A substantial though variable proportion of outbreaks has been classified as such each year (Figure 5). In addition, an occasional outbreak-one in 1987 (22) and one in 1988 that is described here-has been classified as an outbreak of CGI of unknown etiology, a syndrome previously associated with consumption of raw milk (23). Some outbreaks were classified as being of unknown etiology after cursory investigations, others after rigorous investigations that were unrevealing. The clinical features of some of the illnesses suggest viral etiologies; however, clinical diagnosis is not very specific. Identification of the etiologic agents would provide insights into the adequacy of current water treatment processes. More timely investigations and increased availability of tests to identify viral agents and various novel pathogens may aid in elucidating the causes of these outbreaks. Even so, the isolation of coliforms from water samples during most investigations of outbreaks of AGI in 1989-1990 indicates that chlorine-sensitive organisms, not just relatively chlorine-resistant organisms such as viruses, were present in the water. Therefore, the readily available technology to eliminate chlorinesensitive organisms should be applied more consistently and reliably.

The possible outbreak associated with bottled water was reported at a time of increased concern about the quality and safety of bottled water. Although EPA regulates public drinking water systems, the Food and Drug Administration sets standards for the quality of the bottled water that is sold in interstate commerce. The adequacy of the standards for bottled water and the means of enforcing the standards have recently been reviewed (24).

No chemical intoxications were reported for 1989 or 1990, but lead-contaminated drinking water in Hawaii in 1988 was associated with elevated blood lead levels. The investigation was prompted by concern that acid rain secondary to volcanic activity was causing lead to be leached from various materials. Recently, EPA promulgated a revised National Priority Drinking Water Regulation for lead in public water systems (56 FR 26459-564, June 7, 1991); the regulation requires lead levels to be ≤15 ppb in at least 90% of tap water samples from high-risk homes after the water has been

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standing overnight in the household plumbing. Although this regulation technically applies only to public water systems, its underlying scientific rationale is relevant to all types of water systems. Of note, the waterborne-disease surveillance system is better equipped to detect acute chemical intoxications than the effects of chronic exposures to toxins.

Outbreaks Associated with Recreational Water Use

In 1989–1990, more WBDOs but fewer cases were attributed to recreational exposures than to ingestion of water intended for drinking. The extent of underrecognition and underreporting of outbreaks associated with recreational exposures is unknown. The newly revised outbreak report form (Figure 1) should facilitate reporting these outbreaks. Presumably many outbreaks of *Pseudomonas* folliculitis are not reported, since this is a relatively mild disease. Although most of the 13 reported outbreaks of folliculitis were relatively small, 300 persons became ill in one of the outbreaks. These outbreaks are preventable if the water in hot tubs and whirlpools is maintained at a pH of 7.2-7.8 with free residual chlorine levels from 2 to 5 mg/L, as specified in CDC's guidelines for public spas and hot tubs (25). Another risk of whirlpool use is Pontiac fever resulting from aerosolized antigens of *Legionella pneumophila* (26,27).

Swimming-associated outbreaks of shigellosis, which have been documented previously (28-30), continue to occur. Only a small inoculum of organisms is necessary to cause illness; therefore, even persons who do not swallow large volumes of water can become infected. The EPA has published criteria for evaluating the quality of fresh and marine recreational waters (31,32). The first outbreak of hepatitis A associated with use of a swimming pool was reported (10). Three persons with swimming-associated primary amebic meningoencephalitis due to Naegleria fowleri were reported, even though such case reports were not explicitly solicited. Sporadic cases of this fatal disease have been documented previously (33).

Outbreaks on Cruise Ships

The outbreaks in 1989–1990 aboard passenger cruise ships were notable because some occurred on consecutive cruises. This phenomenon has been observed previously (34-36). An earlier investigation of one of a series of outbreaks implicated vomitus in the transmission of a viral agent (36). The goal of CDC's Vessel Sanitation Program, which was established in 1975, is to prevent outbreaks of gastroenteritis on cruise ships (37,38).

CONCLUSION

Waterborne diseases in the United States are not associated with as much morbidity and mortality as they were earlier in this century. However, WBDOs continue to occur, sometimes even in relatively sophisticated community water systems. CDC and EPA have monitored the occurrence of WBDOs for two decades. The continued surveillance of WBDOs on a national level makes it possible to characterize the changing epidemiology of waterborne diseases and to identify the types of water systems, the water system deficiencies, and the etiologic agents associated with outbreaks. Agents only recently associated with WBDOs include *E. coli* O157:H7, CLB, and *Cryptosporidium* (39). Identification of such agents is important, since they may require new means of control. Persons investigating future

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outbreaks also need to be aware that these organisms are possible etiologic agents, and therefore the laboratory investigations should be structured accordingly. Strengthened surveillance of WBDOs may be possible, since 46 (92%) of the states have designated persons to coordinate this activity. The ongoing challenge is to structure the surveillance system so that the data are applied to prevent outbreaks.

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State	Year	Month	Class [†]	Etiologic agent ^s	No. cases	Type of system	Defi- ciency	Source	Setting
	0001		=	Cicadio	18	NC		River	Lodae
AK	1990	Mar	=.				- c	Corino	
AL	1989	Sep	_	AGI	700	EoC	1	Sinds	
AB	1990	int.	Ξ	AGI	75	pul	7	Well	Residence
(<	1080	Anr		Norwalk-like	006	NC	ო	Well	Resort
				AGI	12	NC	ო	Spring	Camp
				Giardia	6	Com	n	River	Community
38				Giardia	123	E CO		Spring	Community
39	1990	5nt	_ =		21.5	hul		l ake	Cabin
<u>2</u> :	1909	514	Ξ.		100		. 7	ake	Hosnital
1	1990				11			Mall	Rectaurant
Σ	1989	Apr		JOY	+ c		, c	Moll	
ZN	1990	LeD		15E	0,1		4	12/1	
NM	1990	Aug		AGI		Z	4	Mell	Resort
0W	1989	Dec		Escherichia coli 0157:H7	243	Com	4	Well	Community**
0W	1990	Mav		AGI		Com	ო	Lake	Community
0 M	1990	Jul		AGI		NC	ო	Well	Resort
N.N.	1989	Jul		AGI		NC	ო	Well	Camp ¹¹
ž	1989	Apr	_	Giardia	308	Com	ო	Reservoir	Community
λ	1989	Jun	_	Giardia	152	NC	ო	Reservoir	Prison
≻z	1989	Jul	_	Giardia	53	Com	ო	Lake	Community
PA	1989	Jul		AGI	50	NC	2	Well	Camp ¹
PA	1990	Mav		Hepatitis A	22	Ind	2	Well	Group of 5 homes
PA	1990	Nov	=	Hepatitis A	m	Com	ო	Well	Community
PA	1990	Dec	-	AGI	63	Com	ŋ	Lake	lnn
Z	1990	Mav	:	AGI	1000	NC	ო	Well	Country club
5	1989	Jun		AGI	22	Com	2	Well	Housing development
5	1990	Mar	_	Giardia	24	NC	ო	Lake	Resort

See Table 3 for class definitions. [§]AGI = acute gastrointestinal illness of unknown etiology; CLB = cyanobacteria (blue-green algae)-like bodies. [¶]NC = noncommunity; Com = community; Ind = individual. ^{**}Resulted in 4 deaths. ^{*†}The vehicle of transmission was iced tea. ^{§§}Two punches made with the water and watermelon kept cool in the water were implicated.

TABLE 2. Waterborne disease outbreaks not included in previous summaries, United States, 1988 (N = 7)*

A. Out	breaks as	sociated	with water in	tended f	or drinking			
State	Month	Class [†]	Etiologic agent ^s	No. cases	Type of system	Deficiency	Source	Setting
OK	Nov		CGI	22	Com	3	Well	Community
WA	Sep	11	Hepatitis A	9	Com	3	Well	Trailer

B. Outbreaks associated with recreational water use

State	Month	Class [†]	iliness	Etiologic agent ^s	No. cases	Source**	Setting
MD	Apr		Folliculitis	Pseudomonas	14	Whirlpool	Hotel
MN	Jan		Folliculitis;	Pseudomonas;	28	Whirlpool	Hotel
			Pontiac fever	L. pneumophila			
MN	Feb		Folliculitis	c/w Pseudomonas	34	Pool/whirlpool	Hotel
MN	Jun	н	Gastroenteritis	AGI	24	Lake	Swimming area
MN	Dec		Folliculitis	c/w Pseudomonas	18	Whirlpool	Resort
*Cool	امحام ما		. fan de a testian	a familia a second at	1		

*See Methods section for description of reporting variables. *See Table 3 for class definitions.

^sCGI = chronic gastrointestinal illness of unknown etiology; c/w = consistent with; AGI = acute gastrointestinal illness of unknown etiology.

}

Com = community. **The source is identified here as it was on the report form. If more than 1 source is listed (e.g., pool/whirlpool), both were possible sources.

TABLE 3. Classification of investigations

Class*	Epidemiologic data	Water quality data
1	Adequate: [†] (A) data were provided about exposed and unexposed persons; and (B) the relative risk or odds ratio was \geq 2, or the p-value was \leq 0.05.	Provided and adequate: could be historic information or laboratory data. Examples: the history that a chlorinator malfunctioned or a water main broke; no detectable free chlorine residual; the presence of coliforms in the water.
11	Adequate.	Not provided or inadequate. Example: stating that a lake was crowded
111	Provided, but limited: (A) epidemiologic data were provided that did not meet the criteria for Class I; or (B) the statement was made that ill persons had no exposures in common besides water, but no data were provided.	Provided and adequate.
IV	Provided, but limited.	Not provided or inadequate.

the outbreak report form.

[†]Adequate to implicate water.

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Ctate	Vear	Month	Class*	Illness	Etiologic agent [†]	No. cases	Source ^s	Setting
	0001	Mari		Enline	Pseudomonas	10	Hot tub	Resort
¥ 9	1000	hill		Amebic meningoencephalitis	Naegleria		Lake	Swimming area
ç.			=	Lanatitie	Henatitis A	20	Pool	Campground
۲	1989	sep Lob	=	Folliculitie	Pseudomonas	m n	Hot tub	Hotel
ų į	1909	Len Linn		Folliculitie	Pseudomonas	ŝ	Hot tub	Motel
	1000		Ξ	Gaetroenteritis	AGI	22	Lake	Park
	1080		Ē	Gastroenteritis	Shiaella sonnei	65	Pond	Park
NN	1989	Mar	-	Folliculitis	c/w Pseudomonas	300	Whirlpool	Hotel
NM	1990	Jan		Folliculitis	c/w Pseudomonas	10	Pool/whirlpool	Motel
N	1990	Jul	=	Gastroenteritis	AGI	18	Lake	Camp
WS	1990	Apr		Folliculitis	Pseudomonas	10	Hot tub	Motel
ı ن	1990	Jun	_	Gastroenteritis	Shigella sonnei	68	Lake	Recreation area
	1989	Jun	_	Gastroenteritis	AGI	17	Lake	Park
	1989	lul	_	Gastroenteritis	AGI	26	Lake	Swimming area
≥	1990	Jul	2	Gastroenteritis	Shigella sonnei	7	Lake	Park
R	1990	JuL	=	Gastroenteritis	Shigella sonnei	6	Lake	Park
A	1990	Jul	_	Gastroenteritis	AGI	60	Lake	Camp
Q	1990	Oct		Folliculitis	Pseudomonas	30	Whirlpool	Apt. clubhouse
×	1989	Jul		Amebic meningoencephalitis	Naegleria	-	Pool/lake	Swimming area
×	1989	Aug		Amebic meningoencephalitis	Naegleria	-	Pool/pond	Military base
×	1990	Feb		Folliculitis	Pseudomonas	7	Pool/whirlpool	Hotel
F	1990	Feb		Folliculitis	Pseudomonas	23	Whirlpool	Hotel
٨A	1989	Mar		Folliculitis	c/w Pseudomonas	2	Hot tub	Private home
WA	1989	Dec		Folliculitis	c/w Pseudomonas	2	Hot tub	Private home
٨A	1990	Jul	_	Gastroenteritis	AGI	244	Lake	Park
٨A	1990	Oct		Folliculitis	c/w Pseudomonas	ო	Hot tub	Private home
N	1990	ղոր	_	Gastroenteritis	AGI	79	Lake	Park
5	1990	Aug	≥	Gastroenteritis	Shigella sonnei	10	Wading pool	Park
٧۲	1989	Jan		Folliculitis	Pseudomonas	2	Spa	Motel
λ	1990	nn	Ξ	Gastroenteritis	AGI	4	Pond	Information center

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Vol. 40, No. SS-3

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TABLE 5. Outbreaks associated with water intended for drinking, by etiologic agent and type of water system, United States, 1989-1990 (N=26)

			Туре	of wa	ter system	*		
	Commu	nity	Noncomm	nunity	Individ	ual	Tota	I
Agent [†]	Outbreaks	Cases	Outbreaks	Cases	Outbreaks	Cases	Outbreaks	Cases
AGI	4	894	8	1402	2	106	14	2402
Giardia	4	503	3	194	0	0	7	697
Hepatitis A	1	3	Ō	0	1	22	2	25
Norwalk-like	0	Ō	1	900	ò	0	1	900
Escherichia coli 0157:H7	1	243	0	0	0	0	1	243
CLB (possible)	1	21	0	0	0	0	1	21
Total	11	1664	12	2496	3	128	26	4288
Percent⁵	42	39	46	58	12	3	100	100

*See Methods section for descriptions of reporting variables. [†]AGI = acute gastrointestinal illness of unknown etiology; CLB = cyanobacteria (blue-green algae)-like bodies. [§]The percentage of 26 outbreaks or of 4,288 cases.

TABLE 6. Outbreaks	associated with	h water intend	led for o	drinking,	by t	type	of
deficiency and type of							

		Type of water sy Number (%)		
Type of deficiency	Community	Noncommunity	Individual	Total
Untreated surface water	0 (0)	1 (18)	1 (33)	2 (8)
Untreated groundwater	2 (18)	2 (17)	2 (67)	6 (23)
Treatment	6 (55)	8 (67)	0 (0)	14 (54)
Distribution system	2 (18)	1 (8)	0 (0)	3 (12)
Unknown	1 (9)	0 (0)	0 (0)	1 (4)
Total	11 (100)	12 (100)	3 (100)	26 (100)

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FIGURE 1. The newly revised report form (CDC Form 52.12, Rev. 02-91) for waterborne-disease outbreaks, both those associated with water intended for drinking and those associated with recreational water use.


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LENTER FOR INFECTIOUS	DISEASES Ingestion conta caused by water	ct or inhalation: to recre- related organisms	ealional water excluding	wound in	lections	0	WE No. 093	ed 20-000-4
SUBMITTED COPIES OF	THIS FORM SHOULD INCLUDE	AS MUCH INFORMATI	ON AS POSSIBLE: BUT	THE COM	LETION OF	EVERY ITS	IN IS NOT	REQUIR
1 TYPE of EXPOSURE	2. LOCATION of OUTBREAK		3. DATE of OUTBRE		4. NUMBER		Actua	Estima
Wale intended	State		Date first case be	came illi	Persons			- ·
for deaking	City 0*				Persons			ł
Recreational	Gaunty	n - folderspect	40 Day	L	Hospitali	red		
					Fatalities		7. DURAT	
	is with the following symptoms		S OBTAINED and skip to question 6:		6 INCUBA PERIOD		ILLNE	
Diavrhea : 13 stools day		pelintion			Shortest		Shortest	
VISIDIP D:000 IF \$10015	Cramps	Conjunctivitis	Other specify		Longési		Longest	
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Nausea	Rash	Cough						
8 SPECIMENS EXAMINE SPECIMEN	D from PATIENTS: istoo vomit No. PERSONS	US SEIUT BIC FINDINGS			9. ETIOLOG	BY of OUTE	REAK:	
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
FIGURE 1. The newly revised report form (CDC Form 52.12, Rev. 02-91) for waterborne-disease outbreaks, both those associated with water intended for drinking and those associated with recreational water use – *Continued*


12. RECREATIONAL EXPOSURE: a) Route of Entry: intentional ingestion C Accidental ingestion Int	nalation	b) Type of Exposure: Swimming pool Hoi Tub Laxe. Pond Whidpool River, Stream Other		Describe the setting: along trip, etc.)	(e g., héalth spa
a) FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO W/ b) AT SOURCE: Overflow of sewage Flooding, heavy rains Underground seepage of sew		ATION: (check <u>all</u> that appy) se of a back-up source of water by a water utility sproper construction or location of well or spring ontamination through crewced imestone or liasured r	Unknown		
b) AT TREATMENT PLANT: Di Disinfoction Temporary interruption of disin Chronically inadequate disinfe	ection 🗌 In	o filitătion adequate lititetion ficiencies in other treatment processes	Dther		
c) IN DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM: Cross connection Back siphonage	🗆 Ca	ntamination of mains during construction or repair Intamination of storage facility	Dther		
		WATER: (include recreational esposures here)			
NONE TESTED	(provide informativ	on for routine samples collected before and during IN	ATORY RESULTS	as well as lor any spec	at lab stud-es)
ПЕМ	DATE	MICROBIOLOGY		DISINFECTANT RESIDUAL	TURBIDITY
XAMPLES Tap Water	10/11/91	No coliforms		0.5 mg/L	0.1 NTU
Untreated Raw Water	11/02/91	23 fecal coliforms		Not Done	10.0 NTU
ap Water	11/12/91	Giardia; 10 total colifor	ms per 100 ml	0	2.0 NTU
REMARKS: Briefly describe the	unusual aspects of	the outbreak and/or the outbreak investigation ve and summary report, if available			
not covered above.	Аласт ерофиче сы	Ve and summary report. In available			
me of reporting egency:		leting form: , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,		Date Invest initiated:	igation
		TELEPHONE NO (u≫ar),		
	- ""."	5-000.F			<u></u>
port, your internel report, and the qu	ealth Department ubreaks of waterb uestronnaire used	to the Centers for Disease Control orne diseases, please send a copy of this in the epidemiologic investigation (if available) to	1600 Clitton Rd Atlanta, GA 303	ses Branch rborne Disease Coo ., NE, Mailstop F13 133	
s report is authorized by law (Public Hearth Se	s estimated to average	When your response is voluntary your cooperation is necessary in 15 minutes per response. Send comments reparting this burdler is an ATTN PRA. Hobert H. Hunghney Bg. Rm 721-8 200 inde springen DC 20503	or the uncerstanding and com semale for any other assets of	The public hearth problem and the problem of the public hearth problem of the public hearth problem of the public hearth public	en Public Including Office of

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*See Methods section for description of reporting variables.




FIGURE 5. Waterborne-disease outbreaks, by year and etiologic agent, United States, 1971–1990 (N = 573)*

*For convenience, the one outbreak (1990) associated with hard-to-classify CLB (cyanobacteria [blue-green algae]-like bodies) has been grouped here with the parasitic agents. The two outbreaks of chronic gastrointestinal illness, which occurred in 1987 and 1988, are grouped here with the outbreaks of AGI (acute gastrointestinal illness) of unknown etiology.