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GENERAL STEEL INDUSTRIES
WORKER OUTREACH MEETING

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August 22, 2006

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Collinsville Holiday Inn
1000 Eastport Plaza Drive
Collinsville, Illinois 62234

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, Court Reporter

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PARTICIPANTS

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Ms. Deb Detmers, District Director for
Congressman John M. Shimkus

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Videographer, Pohlman Reporting

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Company

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Pohlman Reporting Company

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NIOSH Panel Members

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14 Mr. Stuart L. Hinnefeld, CHP, Technical Program
15 Manager, Office of Compensation Analysis
16 and Support

17 Mr. David E. Allen, CHP, Dose Reconstruction Team
18 Leader, Office of Compensation Analysis and Support
19 Ms. Laurie Ishak, SEC Petition Counselor
20 Mr. Mark Lewis, Senior Outreach Specialist,
21 Advanced Technologies and Laboratories
22 International, Incorporated

23 General Steel Industries Employees

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2 IT IS STIPULATED AND AGREED by and between
3 SimmonsCooper, LLC and Pohlman Reporting Company that
4 the August 22, 2006 GSI Worker Outreach Meeting will
5 be transcribed to the best of their ability by a Court
6 Reporter.

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10 MR. HINNEFELD: Good morning, everybody
11 and thank you for coming. For a lot of you, thanks
12 for coming again. My name is Stu Hinnefeld. I work
13 for the National Institute for Occupational Safety and
14 Health, the Office of Compensation Analysis and
15 Support. That office of NIOSH was created in order to
16 fulfill NIOSH's responsibilities under the law passed
17 a few years ago, the Energy Employees Occupational
18 Illness Compensation Program Act.

19 Part of, you know, our -- our assignment
20 under that, our responsibility is to reconstruct
21 radiation doses that were received by people who have
22 filed claims under this law with the Department of
23 Labor. And so we go on these outreach meetings to try

24 to learn what we can from the workers who worked at
25 those facilities and people who are knowledgeable
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1 about those facilities so they can tell us what -- you
2 know, what went on at the facility to kind of flush
3 out the -- the paper record that we're able to find
4 through certain repositories here and there. And so I
5 want to thank you all for coming and helping us with
6 this.

7 I want to introduce my colleagues who are
8 here with me today. Dave Allen is a team leader for
9 -- a dose reconstruction team leader for our OCAS
10 office. Laurie Ishak is the special exposure cohort
11 petition counselor. She's responsible for helping
12 people who want to petition for special exposure
13 cohort status to prepare the -- the best petition
14 possible and have the best chance of success possible.
15 And so she works with petitioners in order to provide
16 that service.

17 On my left is Mark Lewis who works for a
18 contractor company that we have hired, ORAU's hired.
19 He actually works for a company that the company we
20 hired hired. So -- but Mark is -- has been very
21 helpful in -- in setting up and arranging and
22 organizing worker outreach meetings around -- around
23 the country at a variety of -- of sites. And so he's
24 here today to kind of continue to expand his network
25 of people who are, you know, workers from the program,
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1 people who are represented by labor unions or not and
2 who are participants in the program and so to expand
3 his network and knowledge about the people who are
4 adding this information to us.

5 I want to also acknowledge a special
6 visitor with us today. Deb Detmers from
7 Representative Shimkus' office is with us today. I'd
8 like her to -- give her the opportunity to say a few
9 words if she would like to.

10 MS. DETMERS: I was going to sing a song,
11 but now that I can't move my hands I guess I won't.
12 So you're probably all saved from that. I -- I don't
13 think I'm a stranger to a lot of you. I've been
14 involved in this for a couple years. We've met with
15 workers on and off for the last two years. I'm the
16 one that kind of got Senator Obama's office involved.

17 And we're the ones that now have pulled Senator
18 Durbin's office in.
19 I just want to say a couple things. One
20 is you're here to tell your story. Don't be afraid of
21 that. Don't be afraid of this. Just tell your story
22 just like you've told it to me sitting across the
23 table from me. You've told it to : , you've
24 told it to . You just need to tell
25 your story the best that you can.

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1 The second thing is that one of the
2 reasons I -- I wasn't sure I wanted to talk today.
3 One of the reasons is I have a tendency to say exactly
4 what I think which is not good in politics as you
5 know. So I will tell you guys just so you know we're
6 very frustrated here, and I think you know that. And
7 I -- I'm not blaming any of you at the table. But we
8 have a level of frustration that is growing here.
9 Once a week somebody brings me in another obituary of
10 a colleague that died, and it is wearing on us. And
11 just because there aren't as -- quite as many of us as
12 at some of the sites doesn't mean that his cancer and
13 his father-in-law's death and everything else we have
14 in here doesn't matter just as much. So we -- we -- I
15 do want to express our frustration at that.

16 And the bureaucracy that is involved in
17 this has been somewhat overwhelming. I -- I work for
18 a congressman and still felt like I was a ship in a
19 sea kind of floating around not knowing which
20 direction to go. And without the help of and
21 who spend full-time plus doing this kind of
22 stuff and : who knows more about this than
23 anybody I've ever met -- and you're never going to
24 hear this from another republican, thank God for
25 SimmonsCooper. But seriously, thank God for

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1 SimmonsCooper, or we wouldn't -- we wouldn't be as far
2 as we are today.

3 So I want to thank -- they're the real
4 heroes here and I want to thank them. And I -- so
5 just -- you guys tell your stories, make sure they
6 understand it, and we'll go from there. Thank you.
7 . Thank you very much, Debbie.
8 And -- and I want to say for the workers, all of us we
9 owe a special debt to Debbie and to Congressman

10 Shimkus because they really have been here from the
11 beginning. And actually we probably would not be here
12 today if they hadn't kept the -- the ball up in the
13 air and everything juggling. And so we're here today
14 in large measure because of their long-term efforts.

15 I just had a -- if we can get our friend
16 here to cut on. I just had some concluding remarks.
17 This is the second GSI session for the outreach
18 meeting. And I just had one extra slide of things
19 that I thought of last night actually that were not
20 said yes. So I would like to put them on the record.

21 And I'd just like to comment, this is not
22 pumping up and I. But you know,
23 have really worked at this research intensely for over
24 a year. And got me involved. And so I think by
25 now we really do know an awful lot of material about
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1 these sites that will not be able to be found
2 anywhere. And it's been sort of like the history
3 detective program on TV. You know, we've had to go
4 out and dig this stuff up.

5 And -- and -- and our focus to you guys is
6 -- is really to share all of this information with you
7 to help you in -- in your primary role of dose
8 reconstruction. But -- but sort of in the same vein
9 that Deb Detmers just expressed I've got to say that
10 one aspect of the program really concerns me a lot.
11 And that is that our particular two sites at General
12 Steel, Granite City Steel misnamed and at Dow site are
13 now in the hands of Battelle under Task Order 16.

14 And you know, we're -- I'm very happy
15 actually that Dave Allen is here who's the NIOSH OCAS
16 task manager at that end. But I've got to say that I
17 believe that in this whole process -- I mean, we're
18 not here this morning just to, you know, be friends.
19 We're -- we're here because we're trying to convince
20 NIOSH that we should be awarded a Section 8314 SEC
21 right now based on the available that's -- that
22 information.

23 And since Battelle is actually going to
24 make the initial decision -- not the decision to award
25 the SEC but to evaluate our site, we're not happy that
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1 we do not have direct access to the people at -- at
2 Battelle. And -- and Dave and Larry Elliott have

3 certainly explained to us why that needs to be true.
4 But I must tell you we're not convinced that any of
5 those arguments are valid. So I just want to put on
6 the record that we think that this lack of direct
7 access to Battelle to input our data is inhibiting not
8 only communications but actually our ability to
9 support our contention that we should be awarded an
10 8314 SEC.

11 The other comment I need to make is that
12 there is one other source term at GSI that I need you
13 all to consider in dose reconstructions. And that is
14 that when the Department of Energy came in and cleaned
15 up the uranium dust in the old Betatron building in
16 1994 as part of that study they also discovered that
17 there were above cleanup limits amounts of radium 226
18 in the soil outside of the old Betatron building.

19 And at that point they -- I think
20 officially they attributed that to a high level known
21 to be present in this area. But there is a worker who
22 unfortunately could not be here for these meetings,
23 : who works for a nuclear remediation
24 company. And he said his company has measured, you
25 know, a lot -- lot of radium, both 226, 228 and that
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1 in his experience the levels of radium in the soil at
2 -- at GSI are not those that you would normally find
3 as background in Southern Illinois. So we'll
4 elaborate on that point. And we're not trying to make
5 the exact technical point this morning. We just want
6 to alert you that there may be another source of that
7 material. We're -- we're not sure how it got there,
8 but it -- it is present and it is -- that is
9 documented.

10 The other thing I need to point out that's
11 a little different about this outreach meeting than
12 many other outreach meetings is that often workers are
13 giving information to NIOSH after a site profile has
14 been created. Well, neither of our sites have a site
15 profile. So that's not the situation here. One
16 possibility is that Battelle might create a site
17 profile for us.

18 The other thing to mention is that
19 although there are over 800 claims pending from our
20 two sites and over 600 from GSI alone that so far only
21 four dose reconstructions have ever been accomplished

22 at -- at GSI. And those we -- we obtained copies of
23 those through the Freedom of Information Act. And in
24 all of those, you know, the -- an earlier version of
25 TIB 4 were used. We're now up to TIB Version 3 -- TIB
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1 4, Version 3.
2 And although that does cover or add the
3 Betatron as a source at GSI, the document itself
4 Version 3 does not really cover Betatron radiation at
5 all. But it -- it does have a short section -- I
6 think it's a paragraph -- on industrial radiography.
7 And I just wanted to put on the record what Larry
8 Elliott actually confirmed to us in a letter that --
9 that NIOSH now does not believe that the earlier
10 version of TIB 4 that was used in those dose
11 reconstructions is adequate to cover our site. So the
12 implication of that is that there does not exist a TIB
13 that -- that covers our site comprehensively enough
14 and accurately enough. So somebody's got to fill in
15 those gaps.

16 The other final thing is -- and then I'll
17 turn it over to -- that I wanted to say is that
18 one of the requests we have directly is that we want a
19 status report on our two sites of the work that's
20 going on at Battelle. They are now ten months into
21 this one-year contract. And as one who dealt with NIH
22 grants and had to justify our means of support and so
23 forth for many years I know and everybody knows that
24 ten months into a 12-month contract the bulk of the --
25 of the hard work has been done.

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1 So something has been done to our two
2 sites. And -- and -- and we feel that it's so late in
3 the game, that's why we're actually going to elaborate
4 means to get this information into your hands and into
5 Battelle's hands at this point rather than waiting for
6 the more leisurely pace of an 8313 SEC to -- to
7 provide that information.

8 So I think with that I'm going to turn the
9 microphone over to and let him make a few more
10 remarks.

11 Thank you. And thank
12 everybody for coming again today. Some new faces and
13 some that were here yesterday. We appreciate it. One
14 of the points that was made very clearly yesterday and

15 I'm really glad it did and it's actually helped us
16 decide that we didn't quite do everything we were
17 going to do. We're going to really need to assist a
18 little bit more in familiarizing everybody with -- and
19 we have some information for you with the Betatron.
20 And we have that -- had the abstract read
21 yesterday about the two articles. And what it really
22 made clear to me is that this is an older device and
23 information. I can really understand it's kind of
24 hard to get. And these devices have been modified and
25 there's a lot safer ones.

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1 But when I got home last night I reread
2 this, and it's almost like it was written for General
3 Steel Industries. But it was written in 1974, and the
4 Kuttemperoor individual that wrote the paper -- and
5 it's K-U-T-T-E-M-P-E-R-O-O-R -- it's like he was at
6 General Steel. The article -- and I have copies for
7 you -- specifically talks about an Allis Chalmers
8 Betatron, 25 million volts. We found a picture of the
9 gentleman -- or actually of the Betatron. So we'll be
10 able to compare that to this, and it's a twin.

11 It specifically says activation takes
12 place. It specifically says it takes place in
13 industrial castings. It specifically says if you
14 grind, you got a big problem not only from external
15 exposure but internal exposure. That's huge because
16 regular -- or regular x-rays really don't address from
17 what I've read in TIBs any internal exposure. So
18 we're really going to ask for your expertise.

19 And another thing that it said -- this is
20 on the front page, doesn't -- I mean, you don't have
21 to read very far. It says the size of the material
22 that's x-rayed is important. They got real brave in
23 the lab and they did a one pound link from a chain for
24 the test. Some of the castings at General Steel
25 weighed over 70,000 pounds. They talk about taking

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1 one shot. Some of the castings at General Steel
2 required two, three, 400 shots.
3 . 524 was the biggest one.
4 . 524 shots, that was on the
5 outside. What happened when they found the problem,
6 fixed it? Did they check that casting again?
7 Absolutely. It came back

8 in for a reshot.

9 : So I think we're getting
10 the idea where -- and they talk about the same thing,
11 8,000 rems or 8,000 roentgen.

12 : Some were ten.

13 : That's the article. That's
14 exactly what it says. If the size of the casting and
15 grinding and burning and activation and attenuation,
16 which is where the radiation goes into the material --
17 sometimes they say you can't even read it because it's
18 inside.

19 Well, these guys once it went inside
20 that's how they fixed it, they went inside. And the
21 unique thing about it the casting didn't stay in the
22 Betatron. It went everywhere in the plant for
23 everybody to work on them, to grind, burn, chip, weld.

24 So I think you'll find this article
25 really, really helpful. And I'm glad we had that

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1 conversation yesterday because it really told me. And
2 I did a little kind of -- you guys got one book, 400
3 page. You're going to get another one that's 325
4 pages of Betatron information out of about probably
5 2,000 pages I have. This is a difficult device to
6 understand because it's so old.

7 I hope it really helps. I think we need
8 to get to the bottom of it, find out did it really do
9 what all these people are saying. And there's more.
10 That's just one guy. There's more and more documents.
11 There was an article referred to in Los Alamos lab.
12 We're going to copy that too. Ten thousand seems to
13 be the magic number for activation. But then we have
14 other reports that go down to three and four.

15 So we're really going to ask for some help
16 on this one. And we'd really like to ask you guys to
17 help us to fully understand it. Because it's not just
18 GSI. We know where there's a lot of these Betatrons.
19 This a nationwide issue, not one site. There's a lot
20 of other General Steels out there that had these. And
21 in reading the last 25 years worth of annual reports
22 from Allis Chalmers that I have I got an idea where
23 they went, who they went to, how they were used.

24 And we're going to share everything we
25 have with you and probably with about 25, 30 other

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1 organizations and people because we really need to
2 know what happened to this thing. And we'll get to
3 the bottom of it one way or the other. And we're
4 going to make sure we're not making a mistake.
5 Because if we don't let people know it, there's
6 probably still some out there being used. And I don't
7 think I could let that happen in good conscience.

8 So if we could ask for your commitment to
9 help us look at it like you said yesterday, we really
10 would appreciate it. And hopefully that kind of helps
11 get the record straight a little bit. Anything we
12 have we'll share with you. And like I say, you'll get
13 another 300 pages of Betatron information, and we're
14 going to do that pretty quickly.

15 So thank you very much for your time.

16 MR. HINNEFELD: Thanks, We
17 certainly appreciate the -- getting the journal
18 articles.

19 : Why don't you let
20 talk first.

21 : Oh, okay. Yeah. This --
22 this is really a -- now we're going to get into the
23 workers.

24 MR. HINNEFELD: Right.

25 : And ' can elaborate

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1 a little bit about this situation.

2 Can I -- can I -- I just want
3 to preface what is going to talk to us about
4 this morning. Because one of the issues to me that
5 I've learned about and certainly wasn't aware is that
6 a steel plant -- seemed to me, I've seen the pictures
7 of the ovens and the furnaces and it certainly looks
8 hot and like a bad environment that way. But what I
9 didn't realize was how much material is ground and
10 sanded and -- and left on the floor of these plants.
11 And -- and I want - was telling me about some
12 of that situation. And I hope he can kind of convey
13 that to you, that this was an extremely dusty
14 environment with high amounts of airborne
15 particulates. And you know, it was throughout the
16 plant.

17 : My name is , and I
18 would like to put this up here where you can really
19 look at it to -- to explain really what we're talking

20 about. You're familiar with the Betatron. Okay.

21 This is a -- this is a Westinghouse turbine right
22 here.

23 This is a Magnaflux machine that you use a
24 magnetic field to find the cracks, surface cracks.

25 It's a 240 volt machine. That's the machine. This is
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1 the powder box. You spray -- you spray metal
2 particles into the magnetic field. These Xs and the
3 squares are -- each one is a test site for the
4 Magnaflux machine. The -- okay. On -- on -- on a
5 casting like this you've got anywhere from two, three,
6 or four of these machines around the casting, four --
7 two men to each machine. And when this machine --
8 when this casting is completed with your Magnaflux
9 process it is literally covered with metal dust.

10 Okay. All the defects are marked up either with
11 yellow chalk or these squeeze tubes of liquid paint.

12 Before it goes to the next process this
13 casting went -- you would take an air hose and blow it
14 off. When you got enough dust on there and you wipe
15 your hand across it like that you've got a hand full
16 of dust. The floor around this casting -- let me get
17 a -- give me that one picture of this here.

18 You've got 8, 9 and 10 Building. 8
19 Building was a machine shop, layout, ultrasonics. 9
20 Building was the repair floor for Westinghouse
21 turbines and your nuclear submarine parts and your
22 nuclear power plant points -- or parts. 10 Building
23 was the armor building, your tank hulls, tank turrets,
24 and railroad.

25 8 Building, the floor was so dirty they
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1 used an electromagnet to sweep the floor. You hooked
2 it into your overhead crane. The overhead crane drug
3 this electromagnet across the floor and it would pick
4 up like bushels of trash, take it over to a dump site
5 and dump it into a bin where they hauled it off to be
6 recycled or -- or whatever.

7 Around this casting here when -- when
8 Magnaflux were done and all over the -- all over 9
9 Building if I dropped a cigarette on the floor, I
10 didn't even bother to bend over and pick it up it was
11 that filthy dirty. And think of how much dust there
12 was put into the air. When -- when we finished with

13 Magnaflux and blew that casting off with an air hose
14 so they could move on to the next work site how much
15 dust and dirt -- metal dust and dirt you blew into the
16 air. I -- I worked --

17 I would mention --
18 mention to Stuart and -- and Dave and Laurie about the
19 amount of dust that was just covering the floor, the
20 thickness of it.

21 Okay.

22 : Yeah.

23 : In 9 Building which was the
24 main repair floor the dust would be from anywhere from
25 three inches to six inches deep, metal chippings,
0020

1 grindings, you name it. The janitors couldn't even
2 sweep the floor. That's why they used an
3 electromagnet to -- to pick up the big stuff so they
4 could even get down to the floor. You know, it -- it
5 -- it's unbelievable.

6 Same token, I worked the hot floor a lot
7 in Magnaflux. I worked behind the burners. Think of
8 all that burning chips and stuff when they'd start
9 that torch up and blow that stuff out across the
10 floor. And the -- you know, it's -- it's almost
11 unbelievable to think that conditions like that
12 occurred.

13 In fact, this machine here, this Magnaflux
14 machine you're supposed to -- you got a handle on
15 front end. You're supposed to be able to pull that
16 around. We had to move them with a crane because you
17 couldn't move them by hand.

18 MR. HINNEFELD: Uh-huh.

19 So the -- you know, it -- and
20 okay. This casting here, all that dark spots on there
21 is scale, grease, and dirt collected from the grease
22 and the oil and so on. That's a gear box for -- for
23 the largest crane in the world. So there's -- there's
24 -- okay. Now, that's -- that's in -- that's in the
25 shooting room right there.

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1 MR. HINNEFELD: Right.

2 : That casting is so big they
3 had to move it into the -- into the shooting room on a
4 truck because the crane in the Betatron wasn't big
5 enough to pick it up. You can see the dust -- the

6 tracks -- the truck tracks in the dirt and the dust in
7 the Betatron right there.
8 So there's -- and you get over here to
9 these chippers and so on, the girls they had -- they
10 had quite a few lady grinders. This one big, tall
11 colored lady she'd come in to work every day clean,
12 clean clothes, a white turban on her hair, around her
13 hair, over her face. They would get alfalfa seed
14 sacks -- feed seed sacks and then wrap themselves in
15 -- in these sacks in clean -- so they'd keep their
16 clothes clean. She would come in with like gym shoes
17 on snow white every day, snow white turban over her
18 head trying to keep clean. Some of them even used the
19 -- the asbestos blanket to wrap themselves in when
20 they worked on these castings because they was so
21 filthy dirty.

22 And the -- most of the people in this --
23 in 8, 9 and 10 Building here thought they was doing a
24 hell of a good job, and we were. It was some of the
25 best paying jobs in -- in the plant. In fact, the
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1 Betatron people were highly envied because we were the
2 elite.

3 And the -- you know, it's -- it's -- in
4 the same token street -- we wore the street -- our
5 street clothes in. This is myself right here. And
6 the -- no protective gear, whatever. You'd use
7 whatever you could cover yourself up with.

8 And the -- but when you have to use an
9 electromagnet to clean the floor so the janitors even
10 could sweep up the dust is unbelievable. So the -- I
11 don't know if you've got a copy of this of the plant.

12 MR. HINNEFELD: We've got it in --

13 MR. ALLEN: Got a few different versions.

14 MR. HINNEFELD: Yeah.

15 The -- back there you guys
16 looked at my display before.

17 MR. HINNEFELD: Right.

18 . So you know, when -- when --
19 when the casting moved from the work floor to the
20 repair floor to the welding floor back to the Betatron
21 for reshots, inspection of the repairs they weren't
22 always the cleanest.

23 MR. HINNEFELD: Right.

24 So you know, I guess what went

25 around got around.

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1 MR. HINNEFELD: Uh-huh. Right.

2 Thank you.

3 we appreciate that

4 because the point you make I think is really

5 important, that was metal particles that were

6 activated. It's not like everything -- anything that

7 came off the chipping and grinding would have been

8 metal. And it sounds to me if I understood you

9 correctly a lot of this went into the Betatron, had it

10 done, then went out.

11 So it sounds to me like everything we're

12 talking about, dirt, dust, chippings, grindings were

13 after a Betatron test; is that correct? So if there

14 was any activation and if I've read what I thought I

15 read correctly -- and this is where we'll need you

16 help -- the smaller the particle. And I think they

17 talked about that too that when you activate something

18 if it's a small particle, sometimes the activation

19 could possibly be more the finer the particle. I

20 thought I read that.

21 It gets pretty interesting when you -- you

22 think about it. And brought that up to us

23 today about all this dust and metal. It was all

24 metal, and metal's what takes on the activation issue.

25 So that was a great point. Thank you.

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1 , tell them about the

2 racial content.

3 : Oh, you know, that was

4 another just for the record too that we tried to find

5 out the mix and population in the plant. It was

6 really diverse. And I know that was kind of important

7 at some of the Mallinckrodt hearings. If we

8 understand correctly -- and these folks here can

9 correct me if I'm wrong -- it was about one or two

10 percent women, 40 percent Afro, and the balance white

11 and European. Does that sound about right?

12 Because it seemed to be a pretty

13 interesting factor at Mallinckrodt because a lot of

14 the testing for the radioactivity, I guess the badges

15 and a lot of the bioassay information was strictly for

16 white males. And that'd be interesting to know at

17 this plant too.

18 MR. HINNEFELD: The Mallinckrodt
19 epidemiology work, so the collections of badges that
20 was mainly white males. The -- not -- not who got
21 badged. But those studies that were done after the
22 fact to try to determine health effects in the
23 population, that -- those epidemiology studies were
24 generally done on white males because they were the
25 largest number of people so the studies could have
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1 more power.

2 And -- and when you include -- and if you
3 have a -- a homogeneous study population, you were
4 more likely to see effects. And so that's why they --
5 the epidemiology studies. It doesn't mean that other
6 groups weren't badged. It just means that their
7 results were not included in those epidemiology
8 studies.

9 Well, I -- I think the point
10 that's relevant to particularly the GSI site at Dow --
11 I think you'll hear this afternoon perhaps that there
12 were a much smaller fraction of Afro-American workers
13 there for whatever reason. But I think what's
14 important is since -- since neither of these sites
15 have any radiation exposure data, the only way you can
16 possibly do a dose reconstruction is by using coworker
17 data or data from another site that's comparable. So
18 I guess the point I'm trying to make is if you use
19 that other data, to make it truly comparable it ought
20 to be on a similar population where you have, you
21 know, a mixture of Caucasians and -- and
22 Afro-Americans.

23 And I do understand that there is not a --
24 actually because of the way those epidemiologic
25 studies have been done there may not be as much good
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1 data on cancers in Afro-American people. But to -- to
2 make that a -- you know, to make another site a
3 comparable control group to apply and extrapolate to
4 this group you would have to have a similar high
5 ethnic diversity. So just a point. All right. Why
6 don't you let some other people talk.

7 Sure.

8 In -- in this
9 -- in this conversation here you might also need to
10 think about the number of women welders, women

11 grinders, crane operators who were left over from
12 World War II that were still working in the plant.
13 The diversity, this wasn't a bunch of young people in
14 this plant. There was probably more older people in
15 the plant in the general working conditions of the
16 plant than there were young people.

17 The only really young people were in the
18 Betatron area because of the new technology. But in
19 the rest of the plant there was a high, high
20 percentage of older people, a lot of women and a lot
21 of older men. So this would be -- also need to be
22 figured into the equation.

23 : Thank you, Any
24 other comments from the crowd? Sir.

25 : You had a copy of this layout
0027

1 before of General Steel. I worked there from '63 to
2 ' . My name's , and I was in management, a
3 supervisor there. In the reclaim system, when you say
4 the buck stops, it stops there. I don't care if it's
5 the north end to the south end, we sent material north
6 and south. I had people -- like my first -- myself
7 worked in these places. I worked there too. So I
8 supervised them from down from the north end to the
9 south end. I'd say from 4 Building all the way down
10 to 8 and 9, 10.

11 We had shakers there. You shook
12 everything off these castings once they been poured.
13 And it started south and come north, then come back
14 where he was talking about they was testing.

15 At our supervisors' meeting in the '60s --
16 we had the front office over there and I was like
17 assistant superintendent -- we noticed that the tanks
18 were being blowed up, holes in them. So we had to
19 look at our all process for the reclaim system
20 throughout the entire plant to correct this problem
21 which they did.

22 Another thing, this dusty material -- you
23 talk about dust, the material all came back to the
24 reclaim system. We had magnets that we had to draw
25 out of the storage tank. When they come by there they
0028

1 would take the metal out of the sand, out of the dust.
2 We had to push that aside there. So those type of
3 things all came back to the reclaim system that we

4 worked at. And most of them peoples there were mostly
5 about 75 percent black. A few whites was in there
6 too. But basically we -- that's what we did.

7 The main foundry, you're look at 15. Then
8 down in the Betatron building I had people, the
9 shakers down by 8, 9, and 10 Building. We had done
10 some cleanup work in that area too in that particular
11 spot. If you go back down to these other, 4, 5, and 6
12 Buildings that's where the -- a lot of grinding and
13 chipping was done in. These castings sitting in that
14 dirt and dust. We had a guy on a tractor that would
15 go in there and had to move this stuff and push it to
16 the conveyer to bring it back to the reclaim system.

17 So everything dust and dirt and sand
18 concerned, whatever it went through came back there.
19 We had to do the process of putting new sand and
20 maintain it. So all the core room, the cores was
21 broken up, everything, blocks were all shipped back to
22 the cell -- sent to the -- to the sand system, reclaim
23 system which is Building Number 23 on this outline.
24 8, 9, 10 we had a shaker there. That'd be the south
25 end you want to go to that direction.

0029

1 You come on down this end we had another
2 shaker that shook everything out and a metal conveyor
3 that conveyed it all back. We had conveyor belts
4 underground and above ground that were -- headed
5 directly to the feed and return. So we were return,
6 and we collected a lot of metals, I mean a lot of
7 metals and shimmies, small pieces of metal from this
8 process.

9 So that's my -- my point I wanted to say.
10 But like I say, I was in management there, and I was
11 over that department. And we had meetings in the
12 front office with the president and even bigger guys
13 and we had to go in there and look at our process. We
14 looked at sands, at the microscope, and all those type
15 of things to make that process start here until the
16 core had been made. You pour it and the frame come
17 out then bring it down to these other buildings.

18 And these buildings -- that 7 Building was
19 dirty, full of dirt. There were signs on those
20 castings wanting a sample of that. They never took a
21 plan. The foremens poured it out of the pots from the
22 open hearth any these big turbines, Westinghouse

23 turbines. That was from this building, this floor,
24 and you go another step out at this height of this
25 building on there that's how big they were. You had
0030

1 people that'd sit in there and they burnt risers in
2 here off these castings. They had to cut them off
3 first, eight hours. Then you get into the chipping
4 and grinding.

5 So that's what I -- I bring this up to you
6 all that you understand it. In the reclaim system
7 they -- where it does come from everything came back
8 there. Thank you.

9 MR. HINNEFELD: Thank you.

10 That paints a pretty
11 interesting picture of what happened after they were
12 tested. And I might add the cleanup report from
13 FUSRAP which you guys supplied us with and we had seen
14 it and looked at it, it really tells you in the report
15 the only building that was checked on that site was
16 the Betatron building, the old Betatron building,
17 briefly at the new Betatron building. Nobody looked
18 at 10, 8, 9, the reclaim system.

19 That plant's being populated again now.
20 There are people working there. And in the report I
21 found it kind of unusual -- and I don't have the exact
22 wording. But the company that owned the plant at the
23 time, National Steel asked for assurance and it got it
24 that nothing else would be looked at. I found that
25 really interesting.

0031

1 Or -- or reported publicly.
2 : Or reported publicly. If
3 you specifically asked for it -- back then in '93 the
4 mayor of Granite City didn't know they even cleaned up
5 the plant when I visited with him when I started my
6 research or the fire chief who is now the mayor. They
7 were -- you know, you could have knocked them over
8 with a feather. That was done very secretively. In
9 talking with some of the workers I understand there
10 were guards that were there on site to make sure
11 nobody went around.

12 But having heard this last comment it
13 sounds like the contamination went from one end to the
14 other. To look in two buildings, I think somebody
15 made a mistake. I might be wrong.

16 ∴ This is I just
17 want to follow up on what -- the implication of what
18 saying. What -- I want to be explicit about
19 what we believe. What we believe is -- is that the
20 uranium ingots from Mallinckrodt -- the assumption in
21 the DOE cleanup report is that they entered the
22 Betatron buildings and left on the railcars or on a
23 truck from the Betatron buildings and that was it.
24 It was also clear from the record that the
25 plant management was discouraging to the Department of
0032

1 Energy and actually tried to put constraints on -- on
2 which parts of the plant could be examined. And I'm
3 -- I'm inferring this because we don't have access to
4 internal memoranda and things like that. But the
5 inference was there was a reason that the plant
6 management didn't want Buildings 4 through 10 as
7 I has just talked about examined.

8 And yesterday we put on the record that
9 there was a lot of indication that the uranium ingots
10 did not just go into the Betatron building but
11 certainly were back in the storeroom, were back in the
12 Building 6 area way at the other end of the plant and
13 that -- that it's highly likely that some of the
14 oxides that were found up on the rafters in the old
15 Betatron building, from the uranium ingots I'm talking
16 about now, got recycled to other parts of the plant
17 through the reclaim process and -- and maybe just
18 because the ingots were taken to other areas of the
19 plant. So I think that's an extremely important
20 point.

21 It's difficult to prove that the uranium
22 was there because nothing was surveyed. And you know,
23 those building still exist. So at the end of this
24 process one of the things I'm -- I'm very much in
25 favor of is getting the Department of Energy and --
0033

1 who now at least is only the titular head of the
2 FUSRAP program. But the Army Corps of Engineers still
3 does remediation. I think there's more work to be
4 done in that plant. So that's the reason we're
5 putting this on the record and also to put on the
6 record that workers who worked inside those other
7 buildings were potentially exposed to uranium. I want
8 to be explicit about that, that we do not accept the

9 -- the implication from the DOE report which we think
10 was done -- was incomplete, let's put it that way.
11 That we do not believe they were the only workers at
12 GSI in the Betatron buildings that were exposed to the
13 uranium from Mallinckrodt.
14 Too just a
15 comment in fairness to the people that did the
16 cleanup, it was after a plant had been closed. And
17 one comment that's in the cleanup report was there's
18 no one around that will know anything about the plant.
19 They didn't look as hard as I did. I got 600
20 claimants that were most likely at the plant or had
21 loved ones there. And I don't think they chatted with
22 anybody. So maybe we could help them a little bit
23 with that information the next time as to what went on
24 almost like a factual, here's the plant, maybe you
25 ought to go look.

0034

1, there's another
2 comment back here.
3 : Sure.
4 I was in the
5 maintenance department. I started there in 1955. I
6 was 17 years old. I lied about my age to get a job
7 because I needed it. And speaking in behalf of the
8 maintenance people, you know, I worked with these
9 guys. They -- when I hired in there, like I say, I
10 was a kid and a lot of them were young men just like
11 myself. The electricians, average age about 34 or 35
12 years old.
13 (phonetic) which used to
14 change the cones in the machines down there, when he
15 would go down there he'd let us know. We'd follow him
16 down there and do some -- change the oil, grease
17 cranes, and clean things up. But you -- also your
18 millwright helpers, machinist helpers they called
19 them. I'm sorry. They were all young -- young guys
20 like myself because they'd get in there and do the job
21 for the older guys, you know, they'd -- they hand them
22 the tools, they were the grunts.
23 And the maintenance workers spent a lot of
24 time in and out of that Betatron and in them tunnels.
25 And we would go down in them tunnels as oilers. And

0035

1 each conveyer -- some of them run maybe three or 400

2 feet long. And then they'd dump onto another one and
3 go. We'd spend all day down there greasing those
4 rollers and breathing that dust. We didn't have no
5 protection respirators. When we went into the
6 Betatron we didn't have no protection whatsoever
7 because we were young kids that didn't even know what
8 was going on down there.

9 In behalf of the maintenance workers, you
10 know, we -- we -- we was exposed quite a bit, you
11 know. And it -- I think if you checked around some of
12 your programs a lot of your maintenance personnel
13 ended up with cancer. And there's a lot of young men
14 still left that -- I know there was 14 of us oilers.
15 And -- and I pipe fitted for a while there too. And
16 we -- we spent a lot of time in -- on those roofs
17 while they were x-raying greasing fans.

18 And the heat treat department which is
19 right next door, we'd spend all day over there on
20 Saturday, you know, and greasing the Quint/Staint
21 (phonetic) cranes and -- and -- but the -- there was a
22 lot of young -- young people there too.

23 : Can I ask a question just
24 for the record. You dealt with grease, oil, hydraulic
25 fluids if I understood you correctly.

0036

1 : Right.

2 : In the Betatron building?

3 : Right. We -- we serviced all
4 the machinery in the Betatron building every time we
5 got a chance to -- to go down there. If they was
6 broke down for some reason and sent electricians in or
7 -- or maybe they had to change a crane wheel or change
8 the cables because had them -- they had inspectors go
9 in and check the cables on them cranes because they
10 was picking up such heavy loads with them, you know.
11 And we used to have to go in there. And -- and at the
12 same time they didn't.

13 Sometimes they -- we would go in there and
14 have the whole Saturday to maintain the old Betatron
15 building. Then the following -- maybe a month or so
16 later we'd go in and spend a whole Saturday doing the
17 new one. It was on a -- we had a schedule that we run
18 by, and we'd fill out a report on that there that we
19 turned into our supervisor which was -- let me think
20 (phonetic) and

21 (phonetic), (phonetic), (phonetic).
22 And which was an electrician, I've been
23 down in there a lot of times with him while he was
24 changing a cone, servicing the -- the x-ray machine
25 itself. We'd be all over that thing just climbing
0037

1 like -- on it like we were monkeys.
2 : Thank you because that
3 definitely helps us understand the grease and the oil
4 part of it. And one of the documents we have say that
5 is definitely something you don't touch on one of
6 those machines.
7 R: My name is
8 I spent a lot of time at GSI. I started
9 there in '50. I quit when they closed. I left and
10 went to the Army from there. I came back from Korea.
11 But --
12 : He was a young man too.
13 I was a young man when I
14 started just like the maintenance operators. But he's
15 right that I was a Betatron operator. I worked with
16 My name is the two
17 We did a lot of work together in the
18 Betatron, both old and the new Betatrons. And I can
19 verify what said is correct. There was dust
20 everywhere. If the dust was residual; that is that it
21 contained radioactive material that could collect in
22 the dust, it was there, it was present. Not only on
23 the floor and the rafters, everywhere you looked you
24 seen dust.
25 The maintenance -- the maintenance people
0038

1 that came in they came into the Betatron and we would
2 stop production if there was something special they
3 had to do like repair something, they did it and left
4 and like he said with no protection whatsoever.
5 The Betatron operators, we did have our
6 film badges that were supposed to go to the Atomic
7 Energy Commission to be checked at a certain --
8 because we had our pencils, our dose pencils that we
9 used that would collect radiation if that meant
10 anything.
11 But so far what said about the
12 activity that went on throughout the mill and the
13 castings that came out from the Betatron after being

14 exposed to X number of roentgens of -- of exposure to
15 be worked on by the chippers, grinders, or just
16 whoever would -- had another part to do on that
17 particular casting. I'm sure that they were exposed
18 to any radiation that would be present at the time.
19 But it wasn't an ideal situation.

20 And like I say, I -- I spent practically
21 all my life there. I started there in the '50s and
22 left there when they closed in the '70s. So it was a
23 -- not a unique situation. I'm sure it happened all
24 over the country because they had Betatrons in most of
25 the foundries and things that did castings. But they
0039

1 produced some of the biggest castings at -- at GSI in
2 the world. It was supposed to be like geographically
3 located where the pouring of steel would settle. And
4 some of the largest castings that were produced was
5 produced right there at GSI.

6 : Thank you very much.
7 -- Betatron and
8 Magnaflux. The gentleman's name that was mentioned,
9 happens to be a neighbor of mine. He was
10 the fellow that changed donut tubes. I saw him there.
11 He did a lot of work on the -- excuse me. I'm sorry.
12 He did a lot of work on the Betatrons. He's a bad
13 cancer patient and wears a bag, people.

14 I wanted to mention one fact. Back in
15 those days as I mentioned we did also wear
16 dosimeters along with regularly worn film badges. I
17 remember one incident I was working over in the old
18 Betatron. I had been wearing a dosimeter all week.
19 Before the start of the shift I would charge it, zero
20 it, put it in my pocket along with the film badge.

21 At the end of a 16-hour shift I read the
22 dosimeter and what appeared on the dosimeter was a ten
23 roentgen exposure. I logged this exposure, notified
24 the foreman of it. We had a logbook, a dosimeter
25 logbook. Good Lord, who knows what happened to them,
0040

1 but they were there. A couple days later the foreman
2 informed me that I did not know how to properly
3 evidently zero a dosimeter. The -- I never heard any
4 reports. Along with the film badge that I wore if
5 there was any conveying information involved, it was
6 simply dismissed in such a manner.

7 Now, what I'm trying to convey, gentlemen,
8 is there came a point in time that the operators
9 unfortunately became wary of the reliability and
10 accuracy of film badges that we wore. And as I
11 reported with the dosimeter, the standard joke of --
12 of the operators were simply well, my film badge came
13 unclipped from my pocket, landed close to the shot,
14 and after two or three shots I realized what happened.

15 A week later nothing was ever said about
16 this incident, nothing was ever reported. I ask you
17 gentlemen here that were operators how many times have
18 we heard stories of this? We said it ourselves. Hold
19 up your hands, the operators that are still there
20 today.

21 : We have a very young
22 operator.

23 : And what I'm trying to simply
24 state in this manner is well, our -- our -- our very
25 well-being depended on these film badges and

0041

1 dosimeters. If we could not rely on reliable
2 information -- and sir, we never saw any reports. I
3 never saw in the three years I worked there any blood
4 -- a copy of a blood report, an x-ray, any film badge
5 or dosimeter reports, and no records of such. We
6 became wary. Thank you.

7 : My name's ; I
8 worked in the Betatron. You talked about, ; we
9 were all young guys. And as you guys know certain
10 workers we didn't care for or we had problems with we
11 would purposely take their -- their badges, set them
12 up on a casting, and load them up thinking we would
13 get them shit-canned, get them away from us. Nothing
14 ever was said. No readings ever came back. We were
15 always good. It's truth. Ask any one of these guys.

16 : I think I want to stay on
17 your good side.

18 : My name is I
19 was a -- a burner at General Steel Industries, and I
20 worked on the castings. And by -- what I mean by
21 burner is the big castings, when they knocked the
22 risers off I had to burn that smooth with the rest of
23 the casting. And I worked generally where there was
24 railroad cars that you had to burn a -- a quarter of
25 an inch bevel around the outside edges. And you had

0042

1 to get the cheers -- shears out of the corners where
2 they made the corners.
3 And so what I ended up doing -- I had
4 heard of older mens being there dying from black lung.
5 And so I'm very health conscious, but as of now I have
6 had prostate cancer. Now I got lung cancer. So
7 that's another reason why I'm here because of the fact
8 I was very protected of myself for getting black lung.
9 So at that time they had no respirators.
10 But the respirators that they did issue out was made
11 of cotton. And I would take the respirators going
12 next to my face or mouth and I'd wet those
13 respirators. And if I would breath through that and
14 could see any brown, I'd add additional respirators.
15 And those respirators, as it was put out in front of
16 each other, now it got so thick you couldn't fold the
17 aluminum over. So I'd double it back and put them on.
18 So I'd have maybe five, six, seven respirators. And
19 if I could see in the inside brown from that smoke or
20 from that torch, I'd add more.
21 Now, if you had to get over in the bin to
22 get the shears out or you couldn't get it from the
23 other way, the other burner next to you was burning
24 your back, well, I had a big old asbestos apron that I
25 used to put around.

0043

1 Now, I was extraordinary glad to get the
2 job at GSI. That was -- during that time a lot of you
3 guys are not old enough to know about it, but that was
4 one of the better jobs in the area and you had good
5 benefits. But I never -- I'm hearing now about these
6 badges and -- and the -- and the Betatron and all
7 that. All I did -- if the foreman said go to --
8 (phonetic), go down -- that's my nickname -- go
9 down to building such and such, burn off the risers,
10 that's what I did.
11 So what they did they transferred me up to
12 where they was working on tank turrets. And those
13 would be so hot, maybe 800 to 1,200 degrees, you could
14 only the work in them for maybe just to burn out the
15 rods so they can get the black casting sand and stuff
16 out. And so what ended up happening was you put a
17 piece of wood in there and you would have to wear like
18 the shoes with the wood on them. And when you'd walk

19 on that it's so hot that you could only burn for 15
20 minutes because the wood would literally catch on fire
21 and it would burn your eyes. It wasn't so much that I
22 couldn't stand the heat because I can really stand a
23 lot of heat, but you couldn't see to burn because your
24 eyes was running from -- from that.

25 So now, I was sent to all these buildings

0044

1 because I was a burner and somebody didn't show up.
2 The foreman would say go down to this building, go
3 down to this building. And you'd go down there and
4 report to the foreman down there, and then you'd do
5 whatever he tell you to do. So I was never aware. I
6 just always thought that the American government was
7 taking care of its people. And so now we see from
8 what these gentlemen are saying that they were not
9 taking care of their people.

10 And so when I was in the military I heard
11 about roentgens and things like that. But I
12 understood that to be in situations where they was
13 trying to kill the enemy. And so now you hear about
14 these things, and it seemed as though GSI was maybe
15 directly or indirectly doing the same thing. And so
16 here we can see how -- why this meeting that we're
17 having here today is so important. It is imperative.
18 Because now, I never smoked. And when -- when they
19 asked me about that and I said well, how is it that I
20 got cancer. And I was an electrician before I
21 retired. And so I said well, what did I -- or where
22 did I get this cancer. I don't know if I got it at
23 GSI. I really don't. All I know is they tell me I
24 got a mass in my chest, and I've been taking chemo
25 treatments and radiation treatments for almost two

0045

1 years. So I'm a living witness of this fact that
2 either from GSI or some other source, but I -- I do
3 have cancer.

4 And so I'm very thankful to .

5 -- the doctor here for having
6 these meetings because little people don't have any
7 representation without someone in the know-how like
8 Brother -- (phonic). And so I'm truly
9 appreciative for everyone that's participating today.

10 : Thank you very much.

11 Because the burning process at the plant, you know, we

12 all know that's with a cutting torch; is that correct?
13 : Yes. Sometimes it took --
14 sometimes the cutting torch had to be so long you had
15 to adjust the valves on this end and walk down the
16 other end and light it, and then come back and adjust
17 it so you had the proper flame. So really and truly
18 sometimes I would use a four-foot burning torch or
19 a eight-foot burning torch.

20 And so that -- that's blowing the dust
21 like these gentlemen are saying all over the plant.
22 And when the -- sometimes when the crane would pick up
23 your casting to turn it over, when he locked the
24 brakes up you'd -- you'd run outside because the dust
25 would fall down down your neck. And when you're
0046

1 sweating that -- that's very -- real irritating.
2 : Thank you very much.
3 : I'm I was a
4 operator at General Steel. And after I got cancer
5 well, of course the doctors would like to have a
6 record, your lifetime record of what you accumulated
7 which was supposed to be available with the AEC and
8 other. So having known people in industry, in
9 technology, in politics I -- my family started
10 searching. And then after 90 days time some of the
11 big leaders in this country says what records and they
12 cannot be found or do they exist today. If there was,
13 I'd get them. I'd get them, but they're unavailable.
14 Thank you.

15 : I would like to
16 add onto what said about wrapping
17 themselves in asbestos blanket. This was done all
18 over the plant due to help to keep yourself halfway
19 clean from all the dust and dirt and you name it. And
20 today asbestos is one of the dirty words when it comes
21 to cancer and a few other things. So I would like to
22 add that to statement because it is much
23 under emphasized.

24 : Okay. Thank you. And I
25 think if I understood correctly too that asbestos was
0047

1 worn at that plant to keep you from getting hit with
2 hot chips coming off of the chipping; is that correct?
3 : Yes.
4 I: We used it quite a bit in the

5 -- in the sand system because you had to reclaim
6 system. All them -- the risers -- the riser would
7 come back that directions. So that -- personally
8 myself I stood there on that belt and picked them off
9 with asbestos gloves and we had asbestos material like
10 aprons around us. Myself I was tested positive for
11 the asbestos from working that hot -- that stuff was
12 hot. You had to use asbestos to keep from getting
13 your hands burning. You couldn't use regular gloves.
14 And that was a dusty -- like you say, you go in there
15 and work, you come home and you shower. There'd be
16 sand in your ears, your nose, everywhere.

17 And some of the old-timers had a habit of
18 using tobacco. So they spit tobacco. They thought
19 that would help the dust back there back in the '50s.
20 I tried it, I -- I passed out. I couldn't chew no
21 tobacco. It made you just dizzy, see. But those guys
22 they -- that's what they did at that time period. So
23 it was a -- really not a very good condition.

24 : Thank you very much.

25 I think you --

0048

1 : I'm I have two
2 comments that are kind of important, one to me and one
3 to what you guys are here for. Our -- our foundry was
4 a huge place that started out with the little bitty
5 Commonwealth Steel Company. But it was very diverse
6 not like we're talking about female, black, white. It
7 was diverse from Southern Europe. We had people that
8 came from every Southern European country. And in
9 Granite City even today there are a lot Orthodox
10 churches that were started by those people.

11 They came and sometimes wouldn't even
12 speak to each other even though they -- they worked a
13 piecework program. One was on one side of the core
14 plate, one was on the other. They split their
15 earnings, but you know, Serbs didn't talk to whatever,
16 you know. And our company built a building basically
17 to Americanize these Southern European workers, who
18 these were excellent people I might add. Some -- some
19 of the people here know those older guys. Some are
20 younger and don't.

21 But let's take one family. The
22 family in our core room became very important later
23 because the son, like a lot of their sons, became very

24 important. was of the Granite
25 City team that won a state championship. He learned
0049

1 his basketball in this same building where his father
2 and others learned English. But he went to the
3 , and -- and the whiz kids at
4 Illinois are still a little famous even though, you
5 know, that's back in '41. But -- but
6 captained that team, later became a captain in the
7 s and played professional ball with the
8

9 So it wasn't just diversity like we
10 normally think of it. It -- that -- that whole
11 foundry was diverse without anybody else but the
12 Southern Europeans.

13 The other thing is that hasn't been
14 mentioned that I think's very important is these big
15 casting were blasted, and there was all kinds of
16 medium for that. You can use steel shot. You can use
17 a grit and various sizes. And it was almost
18 impossible to blow that off. Sometimes the castings
19 went right to layout or the Betatron from blasting.
20 This was not a -- a set in stone process. You could
21 deviate with the various things that had to be done.
22 But that grit that came from the shot blast along with
23 the -- later the magnetic particle medium was on the
24 casting.

25 And I'm talking 350 exposures on some of
0050

1 the castings first time around. I don't remember the
2 560, but that's a big number too. But -- but what
3 happened to that under this 25 million volt x-ray I
4 don't know. I can't multiply in my head 330 times 25
5 million because that's exactly how many times it was
6 bombarded. And those -- those particles were -- they
7 weren't just one thing, they were several things that
8 would -- would receive that radiation.

9 : You know, I might add if I
10 may background too was a metallurgist. So the
11 alloy's pretty important. To just say that plant used
12 5,000 tons of carbon steel a month which is what they
13 say in their publication is really just the tip of the
14 iceberg. And the Betatron hitting carbon is another
15 one of the items that's mentioned in the Los Alamos
16 training book which, you know, we're going to provide

17 a copy of too. There's some interesting things that
18 happened with all these alloys. I don't -- we know
19 they had 30 of them at the site. To try and figure
20 out what all 30 and how they got affected -- and they
21 were in military product and nuclear energy product
22 that they built there -- probably going to be a little
23 interesting, a little tough.

24 : I just want to add onto
25 comment that has given us some
0051

1 encouragement that he may be able to get us details on
2 what those 30 alloys were and the composition thereof.
3 And you know, so we will certainly -- that's -- I have
4 a -- a comment of things that we'll send to you all.
5 But that's the Number 7, the other item. So we'll try
6 to get that forthwith because we also need it for the
7 SEC application. But anyway, we'll pass that on to
8 you all ahead of time as soon as we get that. So --
9 : And if we could perhaps you

10 could help us with the Mallinckrodt information.
11 Everybody heard about ingots there. And I'm sure
12 there's a breakdown of what was in an ingot. We have
13 some publication from Mallinckrodt that actually broke
14 it down that we found by some miracle that we'll share
15 with you too. Because it wasn't just uranium. It's
16 really a breakdown of -- by percentage of what's in an
17 ingot. So that might be kind of interesting too.

18 : And to follow on to that I
19 interacted at the Weldon Springs site which was the
20 second Mallinckrodt site out in St. Charles County.
21 And so I recently wrote the current project manager in
22 the DOE Office of Legacy Management, a man named Tom
23 Pauling and I asked him to please help us with
24 information about the Weldon Spring uranium ingots
25 that came to General Steel and also came to Dow which
0052

1 you will hear about this afternoon. So -- so we're
2 trying on many fronts. We've written a letter to
3 Roger Anders at the Department of Energy in the health
4 division. I gave a copy of that to so that
5 maybe he can help us follow up.

6 So we're trying on many levels to get the
7 information we need from the Department of Energy.
8 And if your good agency could help us in that regard,
9 that's -- that's an area where as you know it's really

10 -- for us at least it's tough to get that information.
11 So we would appreciate any help.
12 : My name is
13 I worked at the Betatron from '63 to '66. As I
14 mentioned yesterday about the uranium ingot that came
15 from Mallinckrodt, I don't believe that we were
16 shooting those for structural defect because you
17 couldn't -- you couldn't get a readable film if you
18 shot it head on because it was too dense. And you had
19 to shoot the -- the ingot obliquely from the corner
20 which distorted the image on the film somewhat. I
21 don't think we interpreted the film. I believe the
22 film was packaged up and shipped back to Mallinckrodt
23 with the ingot for their interpretation.

24 But I heard of a story, and I'm going to
25 ask , to -- to tell us about that story which

0053

1 adds a little fuel to this fire I believe.
2 : Okay. I'm . I was a
3 operator there. I come in on a Sunday morning. It
4 wasn't unusual to work Sundays, seven days a week.
5 And I relieved -- a crew says they were shooting those
6 billets, ingots, whatever you want to call them. And
7 they says -- I says well, what film did you use. You
8 know, you got to get relief, you got to find out what
9 went on the shift before. They says oh, no, we didn't
10 use film, we charged the billet, we charged the
11 ingots. And then they went on to the wash house.
12 Thank you.

13 : Are you -- you're saying
14 there was no film?

15 : They was -- they were
16 charging. They -- I don't know if they were telling
17 -- I don't know if they were telling the truth or not.
18 But they says oh, we were charging those ingots,
19 charging them with the Betatron. And later on of
20 course down the line when I -- information was
21 available to me I observed that you can charge them
22 with a Betatron and it will change their molecular
23 construction. And they can be made into nuclear rods
24 or whatever they used them for.

25 , I need to -- I'm -- as

0054

1 a follow onto that when first told me a
2 long time ago that there was some feeling among the

3 workers that maybe the uranium from Mallinckrodt
4 really wasn't just being examined for structural flaws
5 which is the official version now. And you've heard
6 some testimony from supervisory people and workers
7 that worked there. And this last testimony is really
8 very powerful that there was a crew who was shooting
9 the uranium ingots without any film. And if you
10 couple that then -- you know, so I can learn too and
11 change my opinion.

12 So if you think about the two articles
13 that I mentioned yesterday -- and I think has
14 copies of them for you that have to do with directly
15 irradiating uranium ingots with a 25 million volt
16 electron Betatron and -- and you accept the
17 information there that the Betatron is perfectly
18 capable of and did at those kind of intensities split
19 the uranium atom. And in fact, as I said on the slide
20 yesterday you can get, you know, a slight amount of
21 enrichment.

22 But the other part of that story is that
23 there is a wealth of literature from the Department of
24 Energy and specifically at Oak Ridge National
25 Laboratory that they've had a program I became aware
0055

1 of that's been ongoing for 20 years that specifically
2 looks at the destructive secondary responses of
3 different metals that are irradiated at these high
4 intensities. So not only does -- I mean, and -- and
5 so in a way that's complimentary information the
6 Betatron can activate. And of course, the -- the
7 released energy that's captured within the metal
8 itself has to do something. And what it does is it --
9 it changes and breaks down the internal atomic
10 structure of the irradiated metals. And ORNL has been
11 very interested in that process. And in fact, so
12 interested in the process that the Department of
13 Energy has invested by now probably billions of
14 dollars in research that's aimed at fixing that
15 property.

16 So I was very interested it learn that the
17 Department of Energy now has a very active program
18 where they create metal -- metal alloys. They develop
19 them, they produce them, and they sell them to
20 commercial firms who want to -- and I suppose it must
21 be used in aircraft and spacecraft who -- who can not

22 tolerate any sort of weakness in the metal alloys that
23 they produce and use in their -- in their military
24 equipment and probably in regular commercial flights
25 as well.

0056

1 So if you take all of that information and
2 combine it together, now it becomes more reasonable
3 scientifically to examine the postulate why was
4 Mallinckrodt sending those uranium ingots. And this
5 is another area where I think we haven't really talked
6 about in our meeting. But if there are any workers
7 here who can put anything into the record about
8 secrecy regarding the uranium ingots, I think it's
9 very important. Because in the Mallinckrodt
10 discussion, in the Iowa discussion, certainly in the
11 Nevada test site and Pacific proving ground that issue
12 of access in the SEC process to classified information
13 has arisen on a number of occasions.

14 I have a feeling from what I know that it
15 may very well be that the Department of Energy at Oak
16 Ridge or elsewhere has information about -- they may
17 even have the original records of why those uranium
18 ingots were being examined. And it could be that the
19 structural flaw theory is just a theory and may not be
20 the real and actual reason behind that.

21 So as -- as future petitioners we don't
22 have access to that material. We don't have any
23 people in this room who have Q clearances. And that
24 puts us on an unequal footing. Your agency, the
25 board, the Advisory Board on Radiation and Worker

0057

1 Health, Sanford Cohen & Associates all do have experts
2 with Q clearances that can get into the vaults at Oak
3 Ridge and look for that information. And to put us on
4 a coequal plane we're asking to know about that. And
5 we have a serious question about that particular
6 issue. So I think this is excellent to bring this up.
7 And -- and maybe we have some more input on this.

8 : It's an interesting point
9 because one of the documents in that cleanup report
10 that you guys have access to specifically says
11 Betatron testing and then it appears the page is
12 whited out. There's another one in there that says
13 General Steel Castings and it's blacked out. That'd
14 be real interesting through the Freedom of Information

15 Act and of course you guys have the security
16 clearances I'd like to know what Betatron testing
17 really meant. It has the name on it.
18 I'll be glad to provide that because it
19 wasn't -- there's part of the FUSRAP report that
20 wasn't sent to us that is on the Internet like the
21 first one through four sections I think. And that's
22 where some of the letters are that talk about going
23 over to the site and getting permission. And we have
24 the complete set. And that was kind of interesting.
25 You know, you look forward to reading it, then wait a
0058

1 minute, that's whited out and that's blacked out. I'd
2 like to know what the rest of that is.
3 And there's a mention in one site, it says
4 WAPD. Just a Google search, WAPD actually meant a
5 nuclear power plant up in Washington. I believe
6 that's what came up when I did a search on it just on
7 Google. WAPD I think might bring up Hanford or
8 Haniford (phonetic). And I'm just real curious
9 because I didn't think Mallinckrodt was providing any
10 enriched material to go anywhere. And I was really
11 amazed when that WAPD showed up in the cleanup reports
12 for General Steel Castings not with Mallinckrodt.

13 So I intend to do a lot more searching on
14 that one. So I just thought that might be kind of
15 interesting too to find out. Because there's some
16 reports in there that they give names of people and
17 what have you on the thing, but then it look likes
18 it's blanked out. So some help on that would be
19 appreciated too because I think maybe we could all
20 maybe find out something. And maybe there was a
21 reason for it. Maybe there just wasn't anything on
22 that page. But to put a name on a piece of paper and
23 then have nothing else on it didn't, you know, just
24 make a lot of sense.

25 I Betatrons, Mag.
0059

1 Two things I'd like to mention. One that '
2 mentioned about the secrecy. I had an uncle who was a
3 supervisor in metal form. knew him well.
4 When I went to work in this department the first thing
5 my uncle told me was you're going to see things you're
6 not going to be able to talk about, you keep your
7 mouth shut, you don't ask any questions. And sir, I

8 heard that a lot more than one time throughout the
9 three years I was employed there.

10 Another thing I would like to mention was
11 the unusual. Every great once in a while, sir, we ran
12 into the unusual. One day I was operating in the new
13 Betatron, the 25 MEV. We had a three man crew, an
14 operator, an assistant, and a darkroom man. The
15 darkroom man was always in the darkroom developing,
16 and loading, unloading. We had just set up a long
17 shot, exactly how long I don't remember, it was 40
18 years ago. But it was hours of running. Probably
19 into -- an hour and a half into that running the
20 machine was starting to heat up. At the new Betatron
21 there was a switch on the console, it was a horizontal
22 sit-down console. I believe it was -- it was a
23 capacitor change switch, sir, that when you would
24 power the machine down while it was running you could
25 change a capacitor bank, increase the efficiency and
0060

1 cooling of the -- and running of the machine, power
2 back up, continue the shot.

3 It was when I was making this capacitor
4 change to achieve efficiency with the machine that a
5 terrific explosion took place. And when I say
6 explosion it was not a 4th of July firecracker. Dust
7 flew off the ceiling everywhere. I think I lost about
8 ten years of my life. It was no laughing matter by
9 any means, and I'm serious when I say that. My first
10 impression was render the machine safe, that was our
11 -- our -- our priority orders, render the machine
12 safe, go upstairs into the Mag room and shut down the
13 Mags, call supervision. I don't remember any
14 radioactivity testing being done after that.
15 Electricians were called. Supervision was called.
16 Inspections was made of the machine. The machine was
17 later brought back on line after inspection. But
18 don't believe the unusual didn't happen, it did.
19 Thank you.

20 : Appreciate your comments.
21 This is , again. And
22 we must have had some type of clearances at General
23 Steel. I went to the next employer -- of course, I
24 worked two years for the government prior for that in
25 the Safety and Health Administration. And then when I
0061

1 got to the next employer we got our badges, and I had
2 a black dot on it. And one of the fellow -- oh, he
3 was a foreman. He says what are you doing with a
4 black dot, they -- it's a mistake.
5 And so I asked a department head that
6 hired me, and he says oh, no, we didn't bother to
7 change you from where you come from because that was a
8 -- a secret clearance and it would cost too much money
9 at that time to bump it back down to confidential or
10 whatever needed. So we did have some kind of
11 clearances, but we were never told about it.

12 : Thank you,
13 : You know, part of that too
14 -- I mean, obviously these guys built the ballistic
15 Polaris submarine missile launch tube. That's
16 definitely documented. There's pictures of the
17 Polaris submarine in some of the company brochures.
18 And that is clearly recognized as a nuclear weapon. A
19 Polaris submarine doesn't do anything, it's a missile
20 launching system.

21 And I've done a lot of looking in the
22 again good old Google. You start looking for military
23 weaponry and in particular looking for nuclear weapons
24 it comes up every time. And I've told the story to
25 the Federal Radiation Board that there's one guy that
0062

1 definitely affirmed that it was a nuclear weapon. And
2 he was a Navy guy, and his name is John F. Kennedy.
3 And he said it was one of the single most important
4 weapons that were used to solve the Cuban Missile
5 Crisis.

6 And we know their sister plant in
7 Eddystone was involved in building the missile launch
8 tubes apparently for the Thresher submarine which did
9 sink which was the first submarine made from HY 80
10 steel which this plant was recognized as being the
11 first foundry in the United States of doing. And I
12 think they mentioned the other day that the place was
13 like flies with investigators after the Thresher sank.
14 That plant had nothing to do with it because of the
15 time line, but apparently the x-rays were at that
16 plant. And I think I heard they came in and got
17 those. So this nuclear weapon which is clearly
18 defined in the law as being pretty important. And
19 along with the law while we're talking about it, it

20 clearly says accelerators really makes this plant a
21 candidate for a lot of different things. So I think
22 we just -- that secret clearance kind of rings a bell
23 now. I think we know what they're talking about.
24 : I know some people that worked
25 in the Betatron especially And they
0063

1 were told that if you -- if you see it turn red, run.
2 That's all they were told, if you see that red, go.
3 : Red warning lights through the
4 door.
5

6 Speaking of the Navy material and the Navy missile
7 tubes and the Navy parts, the bulkhead plates,
8 everything that went for the Polaris submarine we made
9 there at General Steel. We had a section that we
10 called gaslight square. And gaslight square was just
11 a -- a confined section that the Navy parts were given
12 a final Magnaflux after they cleared Betatron. And it
13 would be so many Navy inspectors there doing the final
14 phases of Magnafluxing these missile tubes. And
15 missile tubes, you could -- there were so many missile
16 tubes that come through GSI and Navy parts until you
17 just couldn't count them all.

18 But they did have a section called
19 gaslight square where everybody else was kept out of
20 that section except the Magnaflux operators in which I
21 was one that worked on the missile tubes and these
22 Navy parts out of HY 80 steel and that type of thing
23 that went toward the missile tubes and bulkhead plates
24 and whatever that went on the submarines. But he was
25 right about the -- the missile tubes and the secrecy
0064

1 of it because this was a confined area and everybody
2 else was kept out of it. And you couldn't even touch
3 one of those castings. Unless you were a certified
4 Magnaflux operator they wouldn't let you in the area.

5 Then the amount of secrecy over it, well,
6 we didn't talk too much about it. Even the defects
7 that we found we didn't talk too much about it. But
8 that's what went on with the missile tube operation
9 there at GSI.

10 : Thank you very much.
11 : again.
12 This is just going to be a little bit of information

13 about the -- the ships we were building parts for.
14 The -- General Dynamics was a prime contractor.
15 Electric Boat Division of General Dynamics was
16 responsible for building the submarine fleet, the
17 nuclear fleet. And I think -- and might
18 help me -- we built 30 boats?
19 : I believe that's a correct
20 number.
21 : Or 36 boats maybe. And
22 we turned around and built 12 for Great Britain if you
23 remember. We -- we also built parts for the Great
24 Britain -- Great Britain's nuclear fleet. Each boat
25 had 20 missile tubes on it. Each missile launcher
0065

1 consisted of two parts, the lower and the upper part.
2 So you're talking about 40 pieces times 36 boats,
3 times 48 boats plus C yokes, valves, bulkhead plates.
4 : Rudder hubs and yokes.
5 .: Rudder hubs, yokes, a lot
6 of different parts for those submarines. So that is
7 just for your information as to what we were doing
8 down there as far as building parts for these -- for
9 these boats.

10 The Thresher incident, when the Thresher
11 blew up I think it was down 200 feet, and a pinpoint
12 hole the size of a pencil lead sprung a leak in the C
13 valve. And the stream of water shot across the
14 control room into the main control panel, and it just
15 ripped the boat apart. They estimate about 12 seconds
16 before it completely imploded or exploded or whatever
17 it did.

18 The Bureau of Ships and Navy ships were --
19 the Nav ships and Bu ships were interested in seeing
20 the film from -- from that when that happened.
21 Luckily I think we didn't have any. But we were
22 inspected. After we cleared the film we were
23 inspected by General Dynamics or -- or Electric Boat
24 Division came in and read the film. And then they in
25 turn turned it over to Bu ships and the Bureau of --
0066

1 and the Navy ship would come in periodically to review
2 that film. It was quite an operation, quite
3 interesting.
4 : And I guess that metal was
5 interesting too, HY 80 and then we got a Freedom of

6 Information Act did a request back that if we wanted
7 information on another metal that is mentioned now
8 with General Steel HY 100, we'd have to go to the
9 Pentagon in Washington DC. So that is another alloy
10 that would probably have to be evaluated. Any other
11 comments?

12 : I'm again. And this
13 is of a lighter thing that occurred there. When that
14 submarine went down, was it the Trident or --

15 : The Thresher.

16 : Okay. So anyway, all of a
17 sudden there was a rain, and they says the basement
18 became flooded. So they brought the film we already
19 processed. And we had a machine called a X-Omat, and
20 we would run it through the X-Omat again and not
21 develop it. We would run it through the fixer and
22 washer and try to salvage the film and dry it, you
23 know. And we done that for -- I think I worked over
24 three, eight-hours shifts, and we -- plus several of
25 my coworkers had to do the same thing. But we were
0067

1 not successful in saving all the film. So there
2 again, they says well, we done what we could.
3 Then another incident, they went to
4 computers and many of -- a few of the people in the
5 foundry open hearth I guess went ahead and retired.
6 So they put in computers. All of a sudden I was on
7 the second shift. And who was the
8 works manager, president, or something around there --
9 and he called and I answered the phone in the
10 Betatron. He says -- he says I am trying
11 to get ahold of somebody at the plant. We want
12 another tank hull shipped to Aberdeen, Maryland. We
13 want that -- that new Dodge truck, put it on the
14 trailer. It was a trailer tractor, a new one and --
15 just before they shut down. And he says have them
16 rush it to Aberdeen, Maryland, drive day and night,
17 put a couple drivers on it. And I says well, I'll get
18 ahold of somebody. So I got ahold of somebody. They
19 contacted and a government ordnance
20 inspector by the name (phonetic).
21 And I thought nothing of it. You know, I
22 went home that -- after that particular shift. You
23 know, you were always tired. So low and behold in a
24 day or two one of the tank hulls was brought back and

25 it had a shell going through the nose of it. And I

0068

1 start asking questions, and the people from the
2 foundry says oh, they don't have enough nickel in it,
3 the computer made a misread or something. So that's a
4 little lighter. And we didn't know what to think so
5 we laughed about it.

6 : We'd ask you too just --
7 they put a lot of nickel I guess in those turrets?

8 Yeah.

9 : In the hulls?

10 : Sure.

11 : A lot of nickel?

12 : And the regular foundry
13 people -- I think here, his dad was --
14 worked in the foundry or something. So anyway, they
15 had men when they were pouring the heat or just before
16 they had a shield with colored glasses -- with colored
17 glasses. And as a result they would say two
18 more nickel and they'd drop in two billets of nickel,
19 and it'd be perfect. But that computer couldn't tell
20 that.

21 : That's kind of informative
22 too because the Los Alamos report which we keep
23 referring to really looks at nickel when it's hit with
24 a Betatron, that's not a good result, I know that
25 isn't. So that would be something that would be worth

0069

1 taking a look at.

2 elaborate what was bad
3 about that.

4 : Yeah. What happens when
5 you -- they mentioned some metals in there. And I
6 have the specifics here so bear with me a little bit.
7 But if we understood correctly in working with a -- a
8 metallurgy expert they would drop in ingots, billets
9 like they would cubes of sugar in coffee to get the
10 right flavor for these 30 alloys.

11 And when a Betatron, according to Los
12 Alamos, hits that kind of metal it changes it. And I
13 might be wrong, but I almost thought nickel went to
14 BE 7 gas. But we can look that up today and see if
15 that's exactly what it does.

16 And it's funny that D -- DTIS website that
17 I mentioned, I guess the Defense Technical Information

18 System, there's a reference to a tank hull if you go
19 on there with a search, the advanced search it
20 actually mentions a specific tank turret by number
21 from General Steel Castings that apparently came there
22 or came I guess to Aberdeen -- I think they even
23 mention Aberdeen -- and flunked the test because of
24 graininess, what have you. So that might have been
25 that hole that they're talking about there.

0070

1 There were actually a couple of those
2 incidents because another one of the reports said they
3 seemed to have missed heat treatment which was another
4 issue.

5 And while we're talking about nickel maybe
6 these burners and grinders can help me a little bit.
7 If you had a hole in a tank turret that you were
8 working on, what kind of welding rod did you use? Do
9 you know what the material was?

10 : I was a burner, I don't
11 -- I just burned.

12 : So we'll need to talk with
13 a welder I guess to find out because -- anybody else
14 know what it is?

15 : Can we explain what BE 7
16 is.

17 : The what?

18 : BE 7.

19 : Well, the BE 7 obviously is
20 a gas that's put off. And we were real interested in
21 whether it's beryllium related.

22 MR. HINNEFELD: BE 7 is an isotope of
23 beryllium. It's --

24 : That's what I thought.

25 MR. HINNEFELD: It's the radioactive

0071

1 isotope of beryllium.

2 : All right.

3 : It is a radioactive
4 isotope?

5 MR. HINNEFELD: Of beryllium, 7 is. But I
6 think it might be carbon that's the target.

7 Maybe it -- it -- that's
8 why I said I'd like to take a look for you. But the
9 materials they talked about in the Los Alamos thing
10 were manganese, carbon. And maybe that's why it

11 caught my eye because their literature says they did
12 5,000 tons of carbon a month or -- it's some huge
13 number of carbon.

14 . I -- I
15 want to ask several questions to our resident
16 metallurgist if I might.

17 Oh, my goodness.

18 : Nickel alloy is a
19 hardener; is that correct or not correct?

20 : Yes. It strengthened. We
21 -- we had a nickel alloy steel that probably all of
22 you have rode on. All of the Port Authority and the
23 New York City Transit Authority trucks, the motor
24 trucks, almost all of them were made in Granite City,
25 and they were a nickel alloy. And it was slightly

0072

1 stronger than the A 27 carbon steel.

2 And the heat treating
3 process, was that a homogenization process after?

4 : No. It was to set the
5 strength.

6 : Just to set the strength?

7 : Yeah.

8 : Okay. So it didn't
9 homogenize that nickel or make it --

10 : No. They normal -- maybe
11 the -- the terminology was normalized. You heated it
12 in a furnace to 1,650 then took it out and let it air
13 cool.

14 : Uh-huh.

15 : Pretty -- pretty standard
16 practice for normalizing.

17 : There was a lot of nickel
18 in all of your four way -- four-wheeled trucks that --

19 : Wait a minute. The court
20 reporter --

21 Let me bring that back for
22 you.

23 : On the New York subways
24 and -- and most of your transit the trucks that they
25 ride on had to have a lot of nickel alloy placed in

0073

1 those, and that's for the flexibility and things like
2 that. I Magnafluxed thousands of four-wheeled trucks
3 that were used on the New York subway -- subways. And

4 so nickel is prevailing in those things. And I guess
5 that's what it's used for is the flexibility and the
6 -- then the bending and things like that, the stresses
7 that these trucks are under.

8 : I might add for the record
9 too in the railroad business a -- a truck is actually
10 the set of wheels that the railroad car sat on rather
11 than a vehicle truck. And this plant definitely made
12 railroad cars which are mentioned in here for the
13 military in order to carry that heavy -- you're going
14 to haul a tank, you can't haul it on a little 40-foot
15 tractor trailer. They did -- they actually built
16 heavy duty railroad cars for the Army. They had a
17 contract with the Army for that if I'm correct on
18 that.

19 Correct.

20 : And those trucks that
21 you're talking about if I understand correctly did
22 they not test those with a cobalt source in 6
23 Building?

24 : Cobalt 60. Yeah.

25 : And that was the little

0074

1 building we talked about with no roof yesterday,
2 concrete blocks around it. ' tells me he
3 could jump up and down and look over the roof. I
4 don't know if we can -- he was either a heck of a
5 basketball player. But what do you think the roof --
6 or the walls were, ? Were they eight feet,
7 ten feet?

8 : About ten feet.

9 : About ten feet. So that's
10 where our issue with sky shine down on 6 Building
11 really comes into play too because -- did anybody work
12 close to that building or that little area there where
13 the cobalt was?

14 : I did a lot of work there.
15 I did a lot of repair there.

16 : Okay. Did -- were there
17 workers around that building, you know, normal
18 workers?

19 : Absolutely. The only
20 thing they had that would separate the workers from
21 that was probably just a -- a makeshift wall or
22 whatever, sometimes a concrete wall.

23 : Okay. So that adds I think
24 to our looking at the Betatron by itself. One or two
25 little buildings really doesn't do it justice at all.

0075

1 The 6 Building with all the open walls and everything
2 was really of interest. Any other comments? Yeah.
3 They -- while we're talking about other sources I
4 think we covered them yesterday a little bit, but
5 there was mention of a tin shield going around a
6 cobalt source or iridium source in 10 Building. Was
7 that correct, sir?

8 : Well, it wasn't only --
9 almost all industrial radiographers learned to set up
10 a perimeter with wire or string. And -- and in -- in
11 the end of 10 Building St. Louis Testing came and used
12 the iridium source because we didn't have one. And
13 these -- these tin shields that you're talking about
14 had nothing to do with -- it just showed where the
15 perimeter was. And the perimeter usually --
16 from St. Louis Testing hung a radioactive sign on it.
17 And they set it up where it should have been, based on
18 the standards of those days, safe as long as you
19 didn't go past the perimeter wire or string, whatever
20 it was. Does that answer your question?

21 : Yes, sir. Any other
22 comments? I just wonder if it'd be appropriate, do we
23 need a five minute break right now? Does anybody need
24 to use the facilities?

25 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, if there are no
0076

1 other comments, we could probably wrap up I suppose.
2 : Any other comments from the
3 group?

4 : Yeah. I guess I do have
5 some. So I guess I would summarize by saying I hope
6 we have enriched your understanding of the operations
7 of the plant, of the multiple radiation sources, of
8 the dedication of these workers. And we hope very
9 much that you will use this information to do a more
10 accurate dose reconstruction from these people. And I
11 guess we've tried to also heighten your awareness that
12 we believe that it will exceedingly difficult if not
13 impossible to accurately reconstruct the dose for
14 these people in a timely fashion.

15 And I can attest to you that the entire

16 group that's working on these SECs will be pushing
17 these two aspects, accuracy and timeliness. And you
18 know, we certainly appreciate you're coming hearing
19 this testimony. We certainly hope that in the next
20 few weeks we will get some kind of progress report
21 from the activities at Battelle. And I think with
22 that I'll close the GSI session and turn it back to
23 John who may have some other comments.

24 Just one quick note if I
25 could another Betatron operator has joined us, and --
0077

1 . And are there any -- I know these guys
2 -- some of these guys, they haven't seen one another
3 for 40 years. So if there were any comments,
4 , you wanted to make. We certainly
5 appreciate you folks joining us. I don't mean to
6 catch you off guard there. He just walked in.
7 : I really don't have --
8 don't have a comment so to speak. But I did work in
9 the Betatron and Magnaflux and worked with a lot of
10 guys I've seen their names. And made me
11 aware of this. And I apologize for being late, but I
12 had some business. I had no choice but to come in
13 when I did. But that's about it.

14 : We really appreciate that.
15 And we know you guys haven't seen one another for a
16 long time, and we're definitely going to try to pick
17 your brain on operations at the plant. So anything
18 you can share with us will really be appreciated, and
19 you know, we'll talk a little later.

20 You people have any
21 questions that we could maybe answer?

22
23 : Yes.

24 : Can you ask -- ask
25 if he wore a badge and if he can comment

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1 on radiation.

2 : Yeah. did you
3 wear a radiation badge when you worked in the
4 Betatron?

5 : Yes. I did.

6 : Did -- the answer was yes.
7 Can I ask did you ever get reports or what have you of
8 the results from those badges?

9 : I never heard of anyone
10 checking those badges at all. But we were given a
11 badge. But I don't recall any quality control or
12 anyone doing any readings on them.
13 : Thank you very much.
14 : You know a big question I --
15 I know a lot of guys that was at meetings
16 that I attended earlier and they said you're wasted
17 your time. You can see the age of everybody here.
18 They said the government's waiting for us to all die
19 off and then their problem disappears, they bury it
20 just like they buried the Betatron. And I know a lot
21 of guys out there that don't attend these meetings
22 anymore because they think they're just wasting their
23 time. And they kind of ask me -- they'll say well,
24 what did you find out. The same old thing, you know,
25 it's a stall, it's a -- you know, we -- we come up

0079

1 with more information and everything else but you
2 never hear anything.
3 I call them up and give them my number on
4 reconstruction, you're 758 out. I said well, when's
5 this going to -- when am I going to get a result.
6 Maybe within a year. Well, the next guy I talk to,
7 maybe within two years. Well, I've done had cancer.
8 I just had a heart valve replaced. I'm on that road
9 going down the -- the other side of the hill, and a
10 lot of these guys are older than me and in worse
11 shape.

12 And so, you know, I just kind of wonder
13 what are we waiting on, what -- what's the big deal?
14 You know, what's taking so long? And it's been going
15 on for quite a while. And are they waiting for us to
16 die.

17 MR. HINNEFELD: Well, I can assure you the
18 government doesn't -- is not waiting for the claimant
19 population to die. There's no part of the -- of the
20 program -- of this process that involves that. I
21 understand that it is a very lengthy process and it
22 has taken far too long and we understand that.

23 We ain't got that much longer.

24 MR. HINNEFELD: And -- and we don't -- and
25 we feel bad about that. The only reason I can give

0080

1 for the length of the process is that there was just a

2 huge amount of work created by this law. This law,
3 you know, in the way it's structured is -- it requires
4 a lot of work on -- by several federal agencies,
5 three -- three different departments. The Department
6 of Health and Human Services, that's the one we're
7 from, the Department of Labor and the Department of
8 Energy have to cooperate and all have quite a lot of
9 work to do to administer this program.

10 And so because of that large amount of
11 work that was generated when the law passed it has not
12 been possible to provide timely responses to that
13 large number of claimants who came in in the early
14 days. And it just hasn't been possible to do it.

15 : Well, when they generated these
16 laws they also generated some hope.

17 MR. HINNEFELD: Yes. I understand that.
18 I understand that and --

19 . For all of us, you know, they
20 generated some hope that you might give something to
21 your kids or something.

22 MR. HINNEFELD: I understand that, and I
23 understand that the -- the length of time its taken.
24 I can't defend the length of the time its taken. I
25 can only explain that it has been so much work to
0081

1 accomplish in the amount of time, and that is why its
2 taken so long.

3 And I honestly believe at this point we're
4 making far better progress. I know we're making far
5 better progress in terms of completing dose
6 reconstructions and completing research than we were
7 two years ago. And so as we've -- as we've acquired,
8 you know, the contractors we needed and built the
9 systems we needed in order to accomplish this work
10 we're moving along at a better pace. And all I can do
11 is -- is say that it makes us all feel bad that its
12 taken this long. I'm sorry, but I don't know how we
13 could have done it. Given the way the law's
14 structured I don't know how we could have done it
15 quicker. I just don't know how.

16 ;, you have a
17 comment?

18 : Well, I appreciate those
19 sentiments, but I -- I guess I've got to say as the
20 final word I have here is that this far into the

21 process with the recent acknowledgement by Larry
22 Elliott that the four dose reconstructions that have
23 been done for GSI have to be reopened and reexamined
24 then, you know, the fact still stands today that we
25 have zero acknowledged completed dose reconstructions
0082

1 for General Steel Industry workers.
2 And I -- I think I have to sum up my
3 strongly growing feeling that there has been an
4 inordinate, unfair, unequal, unjust amount of
5 attention, effort, work to the larger DOE sites. And
6 although you may say well, our rationale was we did
7 that because there were more claimants and so forth.
8 For these individual people as far as I'm concerned if
9 I were a claimant, I would want to my claim to be
10 considered coequally with everybody in the pool as far
11 as possible. And I really do think that there has
12 been a planned and acknowledged and -- and amplified
13 in many comments by the Radiation Board consideration
14 first of the large DOE sites and much less attention
15 paid to the, quote, smaller AWE sites.

16 And so -- so based on that if not a single
17 dose reconstruction has been completed for this site,
18 that's why we're going to demand to be honest with you
19 to the extent that we can with workers, citizens,
20 advocates, and the Illinois congressional delegation
21 that we receive some kind of information about what's
22 going on at Battelle very, very quickly. And I'm
23 talking about within a matter of a week or two and not
24 later. So I guess that's my closing comment.
25 : Okay. We thank everybody

0083

1 for coming and we certainly thank you for your time.
2 MR. HINNEFELD: Thank you all for coming.

3
4 (Whereupon, the worker outreach meeting
5 was concluded.)

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CERTIFICATE PAGE

2
3 I, _____, Court Reporter, do
hereby certify that this GSI Worker Outreach Meeting
4 was transcribed by me to the best of my ability.

5 I further certify that I am neither attorney
nor counsel for nor related nor employed by any of the
6 parties to the action in which this is taken; further,
that I am not a relative or employee of any attorney
7 or counsel employed by the parties hereto or
financially interested in this action.

8
9 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my
hand and seal this 11th day of September, 2006.

10
11 _____

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13 [Court Reporter]
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